NSA TalkingPOINTS on USS Liberty ATTACK
-------------------------------| JEFF STEIN December 26, 2012
Churchill's Christmas Secret: Germans Would Not Come
I’ve been racing through my friend Paul Reid’s biography of Winston
Churchill like a panzer through France, stopping only to refuel.
Reid, who shares billing with the late William Manchester, author of the first two volumes of “The Last Lion,” in this third and final installment, "Defender of the Realm," magnificently recreates the look, feel and smell of Londoners under the pounding of Hitler’s Luftwaffe, seemingly surviving only on the inspirational exhortations of their heroic prime minister.
That Reid, a journalist with no previous books under his belt, has succeeded brilliantly at building on Manchester’s foundation has been well noted elsewhere.
But a major revelation in the 1,182-page tome has drawn scant notice, as far as I can see.
And that is that even in the darkest early months of the war, Churchill had secretly concluded that Hitler would not invade Britain--and even if he did, the Fuhrer would be decisively beaten.
The conventional view, hammered again and again over the years in popular books, documentaries and movies, is that Hitler did not invade England because he stupidly chose to invade the Soviet Union, a strategic blunder that cost him the war. That indeed was Hitler’s most costly mistake, Reid agrees--but not the primary reason he chose not to cross the channel.
Hitler, Reid writes, wasn’t even remotely equipped to invade England. And he was doomed to lose if he tried. Why?
First, air power:
“Although Royal Air Force fighters and bombers were outnumbered by the Germans almost 3 to 1, Churchill was confident that they could maintain air superiority over British territory,” Reid writes.
“The Battle of Britain is often described as a battle for air supremacy,” Reid adds. “In fact, it was a battle for daytime air supremacy.” By day, over British soil, the brave Spitfire and Hurricane pilots more than held their ground against the numerically superior ME-109’s. At night, the German fighters stayed home. The Reich’s bombers were on their own. So were Hitler’s ships.
Second, transports and landing craft. The Germans didn’t have enough of them.
Churchill “estimated that to put the first wave of 60,000-80,000 troops ashore would require almost 60 per cent of all German merchant shipping," Reid writes. "To put a second wave of 160,000 ashore, along with ammunition, tanks, and heavy artillery, would require far more shipping than Germany had at its disposal....”
Moreover, “Germany lacked the specialized landing craft that could put tanks and heavy artillery right on the beach....”
Finally, sea power.
“The Royal Navy was overwhelmingly more powerful than the German Navy,” Reid notes. Only overwhelming air power “could destroy” the almost 1,000 British warships deployed around England, Churchill wrote, “and then only by degrees.”
Germany would have to overcome all four obstacles to succeed, Churchill believed. Nevertheless, he remained wary that Hitler, in his madness, would attempt a massive channel crossing anyway.
Equally important, Churchill needed to keep the invasion threat potent to isolationist Americans, his desperately needed but reluctant ally, so that they might begin to see their own survival linked to Britain’s.
To Roosevelt’s emissaries in particular, he constantly raised the threat of imminent invasion--even though, privately, he had concluded it was unlikely.
One of those emissaries was Harry Hopkins, one of FDR’s closest aides, “who was sold on Churchill’s resolution and on the inevitability of invasion,” and so told Roosevelt, Reid writes.
“The most important single observation I have to make,” Hopkins told Roosevelt, “is that most of the cabinet and all of the military leaders here believe that invasion is imminent. They believe it may come at any moment but not later than May 1.”
Reid adds:
“Indeed, many in the military in the cabinet believes that, but Churchill did not. He believes the surest way for Hitler to lose the war would be to invade England, which would exposes shipping to annihilation, and likewise any Germans who made the shore.”
Churchill elaborated on his beliefs to a closed session of the House of Commons, in Reid’s account:
Still, they had to remain ready, Churchill warned.
“He never told Britons that Hitler was coming,” Reid puts it, “but only that they must be prepared if Hitler came.”
Reid, who shares billing with the late William Manchester, author of the first two volumes of “The Last Lion,” in this third and final installment, "Defender of the Realm," magnificently recreates the look, feel and smell of Londoners under the pounding of Hitler’s Luftwaffe, seemingly surviving only on the inspirational exhortations of their heroic prime minister.
That Reid, a journalist with no previous books under his belt, has succeeded brilliantly at building on Manchester’s foundation has been well noted elsewhere.
But a major revelation in the 1,182-page tome has drawn scant notice, as far as I can see.
And that is that even in the darkest early months of the war, Churchill had secretly concluded that Hitler would not invade Britain--and even if he did, the Fuhrer would be decisively beaten.
The conventional view, hammered again and again over the years in popular books, documentaries and movies, is that Hitler did not invade England because he stupidly chose to invade the Soviet Union, a strategic blunder that cost him the war. That indeed was Hitler’s most costly mistake, Reid agrees--but not the primary reason he chose not to cross the channel.
Hitler, Reid writes, wasn’t even remotely equipped to invade England. And he was doomed to lose if he tried. Why?
First, air power:
“Although Royal Air Force fighters and bombers were outnumbered by the Germans almost 3 to 1, Churchill was confident that they could maintain air superiority over British territory,” Reid writes.
“The Battle of Britain is often described as a battle for air supremacy,” Reid adds. “In fact, it was a battle for daytime air supremacy.” By day, over British soil, the brave Spitfire and Hurricane pilots more than held their ground against the numerically superior ME-109’s. At night, the German fighters stayed home. The Reich’s bombers were on their own. So were Hitler’s ships.
“Everything changed after dark ... Fighter planes went aloft at night only when the moon was full, or nearly full, to protect their bombers or search the skies for the enemies.... In order to land at dawn, an invasion armada would have to sale at night, but with German fighter planes grounded during darkness, the Royal Navy – it’s largest ships equipped with radar – owned the night.”
Second, transports and landing craft. The Germans didn’t have enough of them.
Churchill “estimated that to put the first wave of 60,000-80,000 troops ashore would require almost 60 per cent of all German merchant shipping," Reid writes. "To put a second wave of 160,000 ashore, along with ammunition, tanks, and heavy artillery, would require far more shipping than Germany had at its disposal....”
Moreover, “Germany lacked the specialized landing craft that could put tanks and heavy artillery right on the beach....”
Finally, sea power.
“The Royal Navy was overwhelmingly more powerful than the German Navy,” Reid notes. Only overwhelming air power “could destroy” the almost 1,000 British warships deployed around England, Churchill wrote, “and then only by degrees.”
Germany would have to overcome all four obstacles to succeed, Churchill believed. Nevertheless, he remained wary that Hitler, in his madness, would attempt a massive channel crossing anyway.
* *
The wily prime minister kept his beliefs to himself, lest the resolve of
ordinary Britons, defiant under incessant German bombing--largely due
to Churchill's exhortations--flag with the invasion threat removed. In
any event, the p.m. needed the home forces to remain desperately
vigilant should an invasion actually come.Equally important, Churchill needed to keep the invasion threat potent to isolationist Americans, his desperately needed but reluctant ally, so that they might begin to see their own survival linked to Britain’s.
To Roosevelt’s emissaries in particular, he constantly raised the threat of imminent invasion--even though, privately, he had concluded it was unlikely.
One of those emissaries was Harry Hopkins, one of FDR’s closest aides, “who was sold on Churchill’s resolution and on the inevitability of invasion,” and so told Roosevelt, Reid writes.
“The most important single observation I have to make,” Hopkins told Roosevelt, “is that most of the cabinet and all of the military leaders here believe that invasion is imminent. They believe it may come at any moment but not later than May 1.”
Reid adds:
“Indeed, many in the military in the cabinet believes that, but Churchill did not. He believes the surest way for Hitler to lose the war would be to invade England, which would exposes shipping to annihilation, and likewise any Germans who made the shore.”
Churchill elaborated on his beliefs to a closed session of the House of Commons, in Reid’s account:
Churchill warned the House it would be impossible for the Royal Navy “to prevent raids by 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across [the channel] and thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or foggy morning.” But those raiders would soon find themselves surrounded by units of the British Army. If such of course came ashore in northern England or Scotland, it would find itself hundreds of miles from London, and irrelevant. No, the Germans had to come in overwhelming force, and land within one hundred miles of London. Churchill believed that Hitler – if he came – would try to decapitate the British government in London, in order to force a settlement with a new, more malleable government. A military conquest and occupation of all Britain, from Devon to the Midlands to Scotland, was simply beyond the means of the Wehrmacht, not because the German army lacked the men and tanks, but because Germany lacked the shipping to even try to carry such a force to England.
Still, they had to remain ready, Churchill warned.
“He never told Britons that Hitler was coming,” Reid puts it, “but only that they must be prepared if Hitler came.”
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  Much more to come on the BlackNET Intel Channel on this "OLD" practice: 
The First Washington Post Story from THE ROGER CHANNEL
---------------------------------------------  - OPEN SOURCE
[redacted]; US/1 - MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS
[ed.note: Check how we spelled Muammar Gadhafi back in the day. How to start a war against a friendly dictator. Much more BlackBACK-Story to come on this escalating escapade. Stay turned...]
April 23, 1989, Sunday, Final Edition
The Panama Debacle -- Uncle Sam Wimps Out
By William Scott Malone
A YEAR AGO, the United States was trying to intimidate Panama's Manuel Antonio Noriega and oust him from power. Today, the opposite seems to have happened: It is Noriega who is intimidating the United States and our power in Panama that is crumbling.
The Panama fiasco is a classic lesson in the misuse of American power. Indeed, it seems almost like a re-run of the 1982-84 Lebanon debacle: the United States faced a challenge from an intractable foe; administration hardliners responded with aggressive military options, but without a practical political strategy; the Pentagon, worried about the risks to U.S. forces, opposed the hardliners. The resulting policy was a half-hearted middle course that accomplished little and left America's allies hanging.
Added to this messy mix was election-year politics. Panama became a political hot potato during the 1988 campaign. The Reagan-Bush administration, which had provoked the confrontation with Noriega, then walked away from it as the election approached. They never returned to the fray -- to the point that today, the United States can't even provide a radio transmitter for the Panamanian opposition we helped create!
The folly of our Panama policy was captured by New York Sen. Alphonse D'Amato (R), who likened it to "setting your hair on fire and trying to put it out with a hammer." [US/1’s All Time Favorite Quote EVER…]The following reconstruction of how Noriega outfoxed the United States is based on classified U.S. documents and interviews with over a dozen American officials and Panamanian opposition figures. The State Department and the National Security Council declined to comment on any of the information. Some of the evidence remains controversial within the U.S. government, which has been bitterly divided for more than a year about Panama policy. Among the highlights: * Cuban commandos may have joined Gen. Noriega's forces in military attacks against American bases in Panama, including an April 1988 raid on a fuel tank farm. Like the Marines in Beirut, the troops of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Panama have lacked clear rules of engagement allowing them to respond to such attacks. * Libya's Muammar Gadhafi provided crucial financial support that helped Gen. Noriega survive U.S. economic sanctions last year. According to one intelligence source, the Libyan leader provided $ 24 million in cash. * In its efforts to topple Noriega, the administration considered a range of tough tactics -- including luring the Panamanian to the Dominican Republic and kidnapping him to the United States to stand trial on drug-trafficking charges. A much more limited covert-action plan was adopted last July, based around a group of Panamanian exiles. But by all accounts, it has failed to bring any real pressure against Noriega. The Panama roller coaster began in February 1988, when Noriega was indicted by two federal grand juries on drug-conspiracy charges. The indictments culminated several years of growing American disenchantment with Noriega, despite his longtime assistance to the CIA and covert support for the contras program. In late February, with U.S. encouragement, Panamanian President Arturo Delvalle tried to fire Noriega from his post as commander of the Panama Defense Forces. Instead, Delvalle himself was ousted. State Department officials, led by Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams, decided that it was time to play hardball. To discuss options, the Reagan administration arranged for Eduardo Herrera, then Panama's ambassador to Israel, to fly secretly to Washington on March 7, 1988 for a series of meetings with U.S. officials. Despite the attempt to conceal the Herrera mission from Noriega, the Panamanian leader quickly learned about it and forced out Herrera -- providing an early demonstration of his saavy. (Herrera later emerged as the military leader of the Panamanian opposition.) By late March, hardliners at the State Department had put together a tentative plan that included economic sanctions against Noriega, beefing up the American military presence in Panama, and covert support for the Panamanian resistance. The strategy, in effect, was to lure Noriega into a confrontation in which the United States could deliver a devastating blow. One specific proposal was to send Herrera and other Panamanian exiles into Panama and let them operate from safe houses on American military bases or other U.S.-controlled territory. They would conduct sabotage operations, such as raiding Noriega's bases, and propaganda operations, including clandestine radio broadcasts. These activities might draw a counterattack -- with Noriega hitting the American-controlled areas. But that apparently was part of the plan, since it would allow the Reagan administration to intervene to protect Americans. Another option was kidnapping Noriega. One CIA official said the original plan entailed luring Noriega for a secret visit to the Dominican Republic. Noriega's daughter is married to the son of a powerful Dominican general, and he apparently feels safe there. The Defense Intelligence Agency also noted Noriega 's Dominican connection in a March 1988 report: "In view of his daughter's marriage . . . Noriega may have sent some of his assets [there] for storage as a contingency measure." An Army special-forces officer involved in the planning says the administration "had a variety of options -- five different ones. One was the DR [Dominican Republic] plan." The National Security Council is said to have debated the hardline options, but President Reagan ultimately decided against them -- largely because of Pentagon opposition. The military feared that the confrontation strategy would make the roughly 25,000 American military personnel and dependents in Panama sitting ducks. The Pentagon's wariness was illustrated by one exchange: The military argued that dependents should be evacuated before any confrontation with Noriega. Fine, said the State Department, but how long will it take? About eight months, said the military -- basing its estimate on information provided by commercial moving firms. Jose Blandon, Noriega's controversial former chief of political intelligence and by then a leading opposition figure, describes the Pentagon's rejection of hardline options this way: "Last March [1988] the exiles wanted to return to the [former] U.S. Canal Zone, but the Defense Department said no." Another opposition official recalls that in April 1988 anti-Noriega forces requested permission from the U.S. ambassador to place a radio station on U.S.-controlled territory, only to be informed that "the Army says no." Despite the American vacillation, Noriega and his Cuban allies moved toward a confrontation. The most extraordinary incident was an April 13, 1988 raid against the Arraijan fuel tank farm near U.S. Howard Air Force Base on Panama's Pacific coast. There's still a lively debate within the intelligence community about what happened, but some analysts believe that Cuban commandos led the attack. The raid began just after 1 a.m., when Marines guarding the tank were attacked by about 60 "unidentified individuals" wearing black camouflage uniforms and using assault rifles and mortars, according to a U.S. intelligence report prepared shortly after the incident. The document noted that fighting had continued for "approximately 2 1/2 hours" into the early morning, but "no U.S. casualties were reported." U.S. military intelligence finally pieced together an account of the Cuban connection only by accident, according to one American official. "Three of the Cubans were wounded in the [April] attack. They were taken to a PDF military hospital and registered under the Spanish equivalent of John Doe. One died, and after some of the hospital workers became suspicious, the other two were transferred to a Cuban ship transiting the canal." The intelligence community gathered other evidence of Cuban involvement with Noriega. One late April report stated that Cuban leader Fidel Castro intended to "ensure that events turn out favorably" for Noriega. Another intelligence report warned that Castro was sending "Cuban soldiers [to] Panama" to render "guerrilla warfare training for Panamian soldiers." Some U.S. officials contend that the Cubans were brazen enough to return to the Arraijan tank farm for a second attack last year, but that the Pentagon has deliberately played down the incident because it doesn't want to stir up trouble with Noriega. A SOUTHCOM spokesman denied Friday that there has been any cover-up. There have been over 50 attacks at the Arraijan fuel depot, the spokesman said, but there is "no confirmed evidence" of Cuban involvement. Castro wasn't Noriega's only covert backer. To cope with the financial squeeze that began in March, when the United States suspended payments to Noriega, the Panamanian dictator turned to the Reagan administration's No. 1 nemesis -- Libya's Col. Muammar Gadhafi. An account of the Libyan connection comes from Panamanian Air Force Maj. Augusto Villalaz. He recalls that on March 14, 1988 he was told to fly to Cuba on a special mission. En route, a Noriega intelligence officer named Capt. Felipe Camargo told him: "Our mission will be to receive $ 50 million from the government of Libya." The plan was to meet a Libyan airplane at an airbase outside Havana. But when they arrived, they were told that the money hadn't arrived yet. So they instead flew home with a cargo of 32,000 pounds of Soviet-made small arms. "We hear Noriega did receive cash through Cuba [around April 1988]," says Blandon. According to a military intelligence source, "$24 million ultimately went through from Libya last year." The CIA reported that "Noreiga [had] run through his Libyan money" by late September, according to one intelligence document. With U.S. military options rejected by the Pentagon and economic sanctions blunted by Gadhafi, the Reagan administration turned to diplomacy. The State Department's deputy legal counsel, Michael G. Kozak negotiated with Noriega's representatives during May 1988 to drop the U.S. drug indictment if Noriega would relinquish control and leave Panama. The negotiations finally collapsed on May 25. While Secretary of State George Shultz waited on the tarmac at Andrews airbase to depart for Moscow, Noriega relayed his final answer -- no deal. Noriega had won! This galled U.S. officials who were familiar with intelligence reports about his harassment of American citizens. According to the latest Defense Department figures, there have been over 670 incidents of harassment against U.S. civilians and troops during the past year, ranging from detention without charge to severe beatings. The Reagan administration took another brief shot at covert action against Noriega. An intelligence finding was prepared in the summer of 1988; a mid-July State Department memo noted that the administration faced an "uphill battle" trying to persuade the Congressional intelligence committees to "support" it. The White House, this memo stated, felt the Panama finding required congressional approval, "since monies must be reprogrammed." The presidential finding apparently was signed by early August. Jose Blandon recalls that during the first week of August, "President Reagan called Delvalle in New York City and told him that he had signed a finding. Kozak and [Robert] Pastorino from NSC also told us the president had already signed a finding." The finding, in essence, provided for "a power transmitter for a radio station and for the CIA to coordinate activities with [Eduardo] Herrera," according to one Panamanian source. Blandon wouldn't discuss details of the finding, but he says in general: "After the May negotiation process failed, there were some plans to use the PDF against Noriega and we received some U.S support, clandestine support for radio and TV broadcasts . . . ." But the American effort was short-lived and half-hearted. In August, according to one source, the DIA informed opposition operatives that they "should expect nothing, nothing, from the military forces of the U.S." Noriega opponents who met with CIA officials in September were told that the agency also opposed military operations against Noriega. By the end of September, even the modest clandestine radio project had been stalled by bureaucratic infighting. According to minutes of a Sept. 28 meeting of the interagency "Panama Working Group," the CIA had not even "been back in contact" with the key Panamanians who were to run the radio network, even though the agency had completed its "field report" on broadcasting from mobile vans. "Technically, this is highly feasible and would provide full coverage of Panama City with no risk that their location could be pinpointed," according to the minutes. "Nevertheless, both the [CIA chief of station] and SOUTHCOM consider the risk unacceptable since Noriega will retaliate against U.S. assets if he believes that we have contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of opposition activities." "Covert operation?" muses one of the exasperated Panamanian rebels. "The covert operation was a radio station! Noriega brought in a Cuban team to trace [it]. When that didn't work, they constructed a large transmitter to jam [it]. We [could] only get on the air for 30 seconds before jamming starts. We needed better technical equipment, but it didn't come." A Senate source confirms that the extent of covert support for anti-Noriega forces was "radio equipment, leaflets, and some sabotage." The radio broadcasts and other non-military operations were being financed from the interest on Panamanian government assets frozen by the Reagan administration in April 1988. The entire propaganda operation received "substantially less than $ 1 million," according to various opposition and Senate sources. The military side of the anti-Noriega effort was handled by the "Herrera group," centered around Panama's former ambassador to Israel, which received $1.3 million last year, apparently from the escrow accounts, according to Panamanian sources. (Neither the CIA nor the Pentagon considered supplying weapons to the resistance groups.) Herrera, in concert with the Delvalle government-in-exile, had been planning to launch a military operation against Noriega, say American and opposition officials. Yet by late October, says one American official, "the CIA [had] nixed the Herrera operation. He had been abandoned -- no meetings -- no explanation." As Herrera told this official last November: "They made all these promises and then totally left me out in the cold." The loss of the U.S. government's remaining enthusiasm for the anti-Noriega opposition was probably attributable to the upcoming U.S. election. Politics were certainly on the minds of the members of the Panama Working Group in late September. According to the minutes, some officials suggested "deferring" the decision on supporting opposition radio and TV broadcasts "until after the election." By October, the Noriega issue had disappeared almost entirely -- except in the rhetoric of Democratic contender Michael Dukakis. Noriega opponents in the United States had been advised to maintain a "low profile" in the remaining month before the election. "The U.S. [government] requested us not to talk about Panama because of the election," recalls one key opposition figure. U.S. officials, in particular, managed to keep the outspoken Blandon, then under protection of the U.S. Marshals Service, virtually incommunicado before the election -- moving him last October to a Navy base far from Washington. After the election, U.S.-backed opposition leader Delvalle was granted a 15-minute audience with Ronald Reagan and President-elect George Bush in the Oval Office. "There must be no misunderstanding about our policy," Bush pledged after the meeting through a spokesman. "Our policy will be that Noriega must go." Yet the anti-Noriega forces haven't received any funds since that warm December meeting, according to both U.S. and Panamanian officials. "No money since Bush was inaugurated," says dejected opposition official. "Nothing." Meanwhile, Noriega continues his intimidation of Americans. Early last month, Maj. Luis Cordova, the head of Noriega's Transit Police, ordered 21 U.S. school buses full of hundreds of American children stopped for license-plate violations. The children were marched from the buses at gunpoint. A videotape of the incident shows one U.S. security officer helplessly screaming: "You're terrorizing school children!" At the moment, the Bush administration appears so snakebit by Noriega that it has no policy whatsoever on Panama. Panamanians are preparing for elections on May 7, but Secretary of State James A. Baker III has privately told senators that the United States doesn't plan any significant actions before the election. And sources say that 10 days ago, before a closed session of the Senate Intelligence Committee, SOUTHCOM commander Gen. Fred Woerner testified that he still would not allow U.S. bases to be employed for opposition broadcasts. The Pentagon believes that such propaganda activities would, among other things, violate the Panama Canal Treaty. According to Blandon, the Pentagon's position still carries the day. "The Defense Department has a specific position -- they want to have the canal open -- that's the only thing they care about. They would like to have an agreement with Noriega no matter what happens in the elections." The anti-Noriega opposition the United States helped create is now in ruins. On April 6, all of the opposition's remaining clandestine radio equipment was seized by Noriega, and the operator, an American businessman, was arrested. "We 're out of the ball game now," says one distraught exile official, choking back tears. William Scott Malone, a television producer, has won two national Emmy awards for investigative reporting. Additional research and reporting for this article was provided by Washington-based reporter Anthony Kimery. [Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]
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15 January 2011
MLK: REMEMBER THE PROMISE?
BlackNET Intelligence
Channel - BlackVAULT - OPEN SOURCEUS/1
[BKNT--BlackNET: REMEMBER THE PROMISE?--OS - Thu 1/20/2005 3:35 AM]
BlackNETNavySEALs.com
BlackNET Intelligence Channel - OPEN SOURCEBlackNET Intelligence
Channel - BlackVAULT - OPEN SOURCEUS/1
[BKNT--BlackNET: REMEMBER THE PROMISE?--OS - Thu 1/20/2005 3:35 AM]
OPEN SOURCE - MEMBER CONTRIBUTION
REMEMBER THE PROMISE?
By William Scott Malone
Editor, NavySEALs.com/BlackNET News
BALTIMORE, MD – The civil rights movement has always really been about economics say the spiritual descendants of Martin Luther King, Jr. And in one of history’s ironic twists, the official celebration of Dr. King’s birthday occasionally falls on Benjamin Franklin’s actual birth date, February 17th.
As one of Dr. King’s remaining political heirs, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, pointed out recently at a Johns Hopkins University remembrance, the fulfillment of the economic promise of emancipation that Dr. King had sought before his assassination in 1968 has still to be met. The irony of the birth dates derives from a newly published book about Benjamin Franklin, which portrays the founding father and long-time abolitionist hero as a slave owner whose initial printing house fortune was derived in large measure from classified advertisements for slave trading and escaped slaves.
In other words, it has always been about economic promise.
For the 243 years of abject slavery between the first American slaves and Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, Rev. Jackson told the 23rd Annual Martin Luther King, Jr. Commemoration in Baltimore last week, African Americans were “issued a promissory note.”
An economic promissory note, said Rev. Jackson, that Dr. King had long labeled “past due.”
“That is not about color or culture, but character.” Jackson told an overflow audience at Johns Hopkins. Rev. Jackson, who was at Dr. King’s side when he was slain in Memphis, recalled Dr. King’s last birthday in 1968. Dr. King held meetings all that day with labor advocates, civil rights leaders, and Hispanic activists about developing a new economic approach to alleviating poverty for all downtrodden Americans. “They brought in a cake and we sang happy birthday,” Rev. Jackson said. “And then we got back to work.”
The colorful and sometimes controversial Rev. Jackson is more noted these days for his Rainbow/PUSH Coalition and its efforts to hold major corporations to higher standards of accountability on various fairness issues. During his speech, he called for universal heath care, a decent living wage and equal opportunity for Americans of all races, creeds and religions.
The annual King remembrance, conceived and hosted by King family friend Dr. Levi Watkins, Jr., has become a twenty-three year tradition at the Johns Hopkins Medical Center. Dr. Watkins, an associate dean and professor of cardiac surgery at the university’s school of medicine, is most widely known outside of his civil rights work as the pioneer developer of the implantable heart defibrillator, first used in 1980, and currently in use by Vice President Dick Cheney.
In his earlier days, Dr. Watkins had been the first black graduate from Vanderbilt Medical School and in 1978 the first African American chief resident of cardiac surgery at Hopkins. Over the years, Dr. Watkins’ MLK commemoration guest speakers have included a pantheon of civil rights leaders, foreign and domestic: Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu, Coretta Scott King, Martin Luther King III, Mayor Andrew Young, Harry Belafonte, and poet Maya Angelou.
This year, Dr. Watkins was himself the surprise recipient of the annual Martin Luther King, Jr. Freedom Award, to the delight of his visiting 86-year old mother. Dr. Watkins became suddenly distracted near the end of the ceremonies as his own contributions began to be praised by the chief of the Hopkins Medical Center, Dr. Edward D. Miller, who noted that Watkins had helped change the face of the university since his arrival in 1970 as a surgical intern.
Unfortunately, even the present day economics of remembering the civil rights period have turned sadly ironic. The 1987 multi-award winning documentary chronicle of the civil rights movement, “Eyes on the Prize,” cannot be rebroadcast or reissued on DVD because of expired copyright licenses on stock footage and music employed to evoke the period. The spiritual heirs of the film series’ producer, the late Henry Hampton, can barely even afford to calculate how much it would take to renew all the license agreements with the major networks, film studios, still photo archives and record companies, necessary to “clear” the film series. Most of the original licensing fees were for five years or less, and there were hundreds of them. It is estimated that it will cost at a minimum $500,000.
Perhaps it is indeed always about economics, as Doctors Franklin, King and Watkins have long pointed out, and as the Rev. Jackson continues to remind us.
Scott Malone is a multi-award winning investigative reporter and producer. He is currently the editor of NavySEALs.com and its counter-terrorism newsletter BlackNET. He had the privilege to meet the late Henry Hampton at the 1988 Emmy Awards.
[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]
[BKNT--USA v. ex-CIA Jeffrey Alexander Sterling: DOCKET--OS]
US/1
[ed.note: Jeff Sterling’s attorney, Edward B. MacMahon, also represented Zacarias Moussaoui during the sentencing phase of his guilty plea.]
Below, courtesy of Cryptome.org
7 January 2010
USA v. ex-CIA Jeffrey Alexander Sterling
U.S. District Court
Eastern District of Virginia - (Alexandria)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:10-cr-00485-LMB-1
Case title: USA v. Sterling | Date Filed: 12/22/2010 |
| Assigned to: District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema | ||
Defendant (1) | ||
| Jeffrey Alexander Sterling | represented by | Edward B. MacMahon 107 East Washington St Middleburg, VA 20118 (703) 589-1124 Email: ebmjr@verizon.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Designation: CJA Appointment |
Pending Counts | Disposition | |
| 18:793(d) Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information (Ct. 1: 12/24/2005) (Ct. 4: 4/30/2003) (Ct. 6: 4/30/2003) FORFEITURE (1) | ||
| 18:793(e) Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information (Ct. 2: 1/5/2006) (Ct. 5: 4/30/2003) (Ct. 7: 4/30/2003) FORFEITURE (2) | ||
| 18:793(e) Unlawful Retention of Classified Information (Ct. 3: 1/31/2002) FORFEITURE (3) | ||
| 18:793(d) Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information (Ct. 1: 12/24/2005) (Ct. 4: 4/30/2003) (Ct. 6: 4/30/2003) FORFEITURE (4) | ||
| 18:793(e) Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information (Ct. 2: 1/5/2006) (Ct. 5: 4/30/2003) (Ct. 7: 4/30/2003) FORFEITURE (5) | ||
| 18:793(d) Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information (Ct. 1: 12/24/2005) (Ct. 4: 4/30/2003) (Ct. 6: 4/30/2003) FORFEITURE (6) | ||
| 18:793(e) Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information (Ct. 2: 1/5/2006) (Ct. 5: 4/30/2003) (Ct. 7: 4/30/2003) FORFEITURE (7) | ||
| 18:1341 Mail Fraud (Ct. 8: 1/5/2006) FORFEITURE (8) | ||
| 18:641 Unauthorized Conveyance of Government Property (Ct. 9: 1/5/2006) FORFEITURE (9) | ||
| 18:1512(c)(1) Obstruction of Justice (Ct. 10: 7/28/2006) (10) | ||
Highest Offense Level (Opening) | ||
| Felony | ||
Terminated Counts | Disposition | |
| None | ||
Highest Offense Level (Terminated) | ||
| None | ||
Complaints | Disposition | |
| None |
Plaintiff | ||
| USA | represented by | James L. Trump United States Attorney's Office 2100 Jamieson Ave Alexandria, VA 22314 (703)299-3700 Email: jim.trump@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 12/22/2010 | 1 | INDICTMENT as to Jeffrey Alexander Sterling (1) count(s) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. (jcor) (jlan). Modified on 1/6/2011 (jlan) (Entered: 12/22/2010) |
| 12/22/2010 | 2 | Redacted Criminal Case Cover Sheet. (jcor) (jlan, ). (Entered: 12/22/2010) |
| 12/22/2010 | 3 | Arrest Warrant Issued in case as to Jeffrey Alexander Sterling. (jcor) (jlan, ). (Entered: 12/22/2010) |
| 12/22/2010 | 4 | MOTION to Seal Case by USA as to Jeffrey Alexander Sterling. (jcor) (jlan, ). (Entered: 12/22/2010) |
| 12/22/2010 | 5 | ORDER granting 4 Motion to Seal Case as to Jeffrey Alexander Sterling (1). ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that, the indictment, arrest warrant, motion to seal, and this order be sealed until the defendant is arrested and first appears before a magistrate judge or other judicial officer pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Signed by Magistrate Judge John F. Anderson on 12/22/2010. (jcor) (jlan, ). (Entered: 12/22/2010) |
| 01/03/2011 | 6 | MOTION to Modify Sealing Order by USA as to Jeffrey Alexander Sterling. (jlan) (jlan, ). (Entered: 01/04/2011) |
| 01/03/2011 | 7 | ORDER granting 6 Motion to Modify Sealing Order; ORDERED the indictment, arrest warrant, motion to seal, December 22, 2010 Order to Seal, government motion to modify the sealing order, and this revised sealing order be sealed until the defendant is arrested as to Jeffrey Alexander Sterling (1). Signed by Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis on 01/03/2011. (jlan) (jlan, ). (Entered: 01/04/2011) |
| 01/06/2011 | 8 | CJA 20 as to Jeffrey Alexander Sterling: Appointment of Attorney Edward B. MacMahon for Jeffrey Alexander Sterling. (jlan) (Entered: 01/07/2011) |
http://cryptome.org/0003/sterling/usa-v-sterling.htm
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