NSA Analyst: "We Could Have Prevented 9/11"

- OPEN SOURCE

US/1; ATTN:   

Washington Spectator  Posted: 05/14/2012 4:05 pm

Thomas Drake, a brilliant intelligence analyst, software engineer, and IT management consultant, worked at the CIA in the 1980s, then as a contractor at the National Security Agency (NSA), and ultimately as an NSA senior executive in 2001. But from 2006 until July 2011, he became the government's and NSA's public enemy.

Why? From his high-level perch at NSA, he saw the failure to act on intelligence that might have prevented the 9/11 attacks, and he saw corruption at the highest levels.
So he blew the whistle. Four times, from the fall of 2001 through 2004. 

Once to both the House and Senate Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence. Once to two Congressional investigations seeking answers to the intelligence failures surrounding 9/11, including what NSA knew, didn't know, could have known, and did or didn't do. Drake was asked to be a material witness for a Congressional investigation, initially led by then-Rep. Saxby Chambliss (R-GA). He was instructed not to tell NSA that he was cooperating with the investigation.

The fourth time was in September 2002, when Drake submitted a complaint through a Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) "Defense Hotline" that allows whistleblowers to report fraud. The call launched an audit of the way NSA awarded multibillion-dollar contracts and managed some of its programs. This time, Drake first alerted supervisors, who either sat on the information or pulled him off key assignments.

When the DoD IG audit went nowhere, he took what he knew -- none of it classified -- to The Baltimore Sun. 

After Drake went to the media, the FBI raided his home in 2007, seizing computers, books, and other material.

Ultimately, he was cast from the intelligence kingdom and charged with 10 felony counts in April 2010, five under the 1917 Espionage Act. "I got in the way of the power structure," he explains. 

Some of his story appeared in newspapers, The New Yorker, blogs, and a 60 Minutes segment, describing how the FBI raided his home and dug for documents to prove he'd passed information to two New York Times' reporters about the White House illegal wiretapping program and other offenses. Although the FBI never found such evidence, the Justice Department indicted him.

I asked Drake if there was more the public had to know. "Definitely," he said, but under the government-initiated plea negotiations, he couldn't say anything new until after his sentencing date last July. Otherwise, the government could have used it against him at the trial.

Once the case against him collapsed, prosecutors agreed to drop all 10 counts against Drake; he plead guilty to a minor misdemeanor for "exceeding authorized use of a computer [!]," with no jail time or fines.

The result, however, was a life severelBaray wrecked. Drake has worked at an Apple store since August 2009.

This is what he told us.

Barbara Koeppel: What did you tell the Saxby Chambliss Congressional subcommittee and the Congressional Joint Inquiry?

Thomas Drake: I can't say fully, because it's classified. But I showed that NSA knew a great deal about the 9/11 threats and Al Qaeda, electronically tracking various people and organizations for years -- since its role is to collect intelligence. The problem is, it wasn't sharing all of the data. If it had, other parts of government could have acted on it, and more than likely, NSA could have stopped, I say stopped 9/11. Later, it could have located Al Qaeda -- at the very time the U.S. was scouring Afghanistan.

It's true that there were systemic failures throughout the intelligence system, but NSA was a critical piece of it. I gave both committees prima facie evidence, with documents. One was an early 2001 NSA internal, detailed multi-year study of Al Qaeda and sympathetic groups' movements that revealed what NSA knew, could have done, and should have done. It was astonishingly well-analyzed current intelligence. Soon after 9/11, some NSA analysts called me about it. Why? Because they were pulling their hair out, knowing they had this information and they couldn't get NSA leadership to share the report with the rest of the intelligence community -- even though it's mandatory! It was actionable information. Remember the time period--we were in the early part of the war in Afghanistan. People needed to act on it, to unravel Al Qaeda networks.

But NSA leaders deliberately decided not to disseminate it. So the analysis -- about what it knew before and after 9/11 -- got buried very deeply, because it would really have made them look bad.

In fact, after the analysts called me to complain, I told my superior, Maureen Baginski, Director of Signals Intelligence (called SIGINT), who was the number-three person at NSA. But instead of acting on it, she got mad at me. She said, "Tom, I wish you'd never brought this to my attention."

BK: Why?

TD: Because she no longer had plausible deniability.
BK: And then?

TD: I said, Mo (that's what we called her), I'm bringing it to your attention because it's information we need to share. This is key to Al Qaeda's position. But she folded. She was going to protect the institution. Screw national security.

BK: Talk more about the Congressional investigations.

TD: The Saxby Chambliss subcommittee began its hearings in February and March 2002. It had subpoena power and contacted me off the record, because it was investigating NSA. I gave both the subcommittee and the subsequent, much larger Joint Inquiry voluminous amounts of information.

BK: What did they do with it?

TD: I don't know. There's a report, but it's classified. I never saw it. And the public got just a small version of the data I gave them. In fact, there's very little oversight in Congress anymore. When there is, it's essentially just talk.

BK: How did NSA react to the investigations?

TD: It did everything it could to obstruct them so it could hide what it knew. I remember hearing from Lt. General Michael Hayden, NSA's director, while the investigations were under way, saying how "convenient" it was for CIA and FBI to be taking the heat, while we remained in the shadows. I'm paraphrasing, but NSA knew a lot.

BK: How did NSA obstruct them?

TD: First, it asked the committee investigators to set up their office at NSA, where the agency could put minders, NSA people who would sit and take notes. But the committee refused.

BK: Other ways?

TD: NSA set up what we called the "war room," to figure out how to respond to the Saxby Chambliss investigation. The joke was, 'Who are we at war with? Congress or terrorists?'

Then in February, Mo asked me to lead an NSA team, to go around the agency pulling together information about what NSA knew that it could give to the subcommittee as its official classified statement, for the record.

So I wrote the statement, which went through multiple drafts. Later, I was in England on another assignment, and I got a frantic call from one of my staff, saying, "Tom, they pulled us off the effort and re-assigned it to someone else." I asked why. "Well, it's confusing, you'll have to ask Mo." When I got back, the first thing I did was ask her why we were taken off. She said, "Data integrity." This was a euphemism.

BK: A euphemism for what?

TD: That there was a problem with the data. But there wasn't a problem. They just didn't want it out there. Congress was asking us to take our clothes off, come clean, say we screwed up, and how we would fix it.

But NSA chose not to do that. Instead, it persisted in the cover-up and didn't tell about the staggering amounts of information it had in its data banks and didn't share. When it's being investigated, it closes ranks. To say they were not cooperating with the 9/11 investigations is an understatement. 

NSA created a secret team that reported to Bill Black, the Agency's deputy director, whose task was to find the agency's 9/11 skeletons. Why? In case you're put on the stand, you want to know where you're vulnerable so you have an answer, or can create one to serve as a cover. The idea is, NSA only tells Congress what it wants them to hear, and Congress will just have to figure out what it really knows. The problem is, how will Congress find something unless it knows what it's looking for and where to find it? And if NSA can keep it hidden, Congress' chances of finding it are slim to none.

BK: Are there other ways it obstructed?

TD: A dramatic one. It happened in early 2002, when Mo warned me, "Be careful, they're looking for leakers." What she meant was, "Back off! Don't say anything more to Congress than you need to." But I wasn't leaking to the press, or outside of channels. I was a material witness in official investigations of NSA!

BK: Then why call it "leaking"?

TD: They were calling it that. For NSA's purpose, it's leaking. Me, I'm serving as a material witness to Congress, which called me to do that. I didn't go to them.

BK: If it wanted to, could NSA follow your trail?

TD: Easily. Bread and butter. That's what they do. In fact, during this whole time, NSA was doing everything it could to figure out and track who was cooperating with the investigators or called as material witnesses.

BK: Why was it so important for NSA to hide what it knew?

TD: Because NSA is a closed, secret culture. Its primary focus is collecting data, even within the intelligence community.

The coin of the realm is what you know. If I share something with you, then I don't have power any more. So why would I give my power away? Because we collect the data, we own it. If we own it, we control it. If we control it, we can say what it means. 

We tell you what we want to, or not. I used to hear that in executive sessions, post-9/11. Other agencies were clamoring for the raw or nearly raw data, to do their own analyses. And NSA was balking because "we don't know what they're going to do with it."

BK: But wouldn't NSA want to prevent a 9/11 or track Al Qaeda?

TD: That's logical thinking. You have to remember, NSA is an institution, and it preserves its integrity before anything else. Rule number one. It's pathological. It's what I call the deep, dark side of this culture, one that has rarely been discussed. Everything is secret. Over decades, people work, communicate, and engage in secret. Obviously, certain state secrets are legitimate, but this goes way beyond that. The agency thinks, if it gives away information, it's fragmenting its identity. In fact, even before 9/11, NSA reprimanded people for cooperating with other parts of the intelligence community.

BK: Do other intelligence agencies operate the same way?

TD: Yes. When I was at CIA, I worked in the Science and Technology directorate on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. I was asked by people at its National Photographic Interpretation Center to look at pictures of WMD targets. I agreed, but I couldn't tell from the photos who was talking to whom without knowing more about the target. So I called my buddies at NSA -- because they have electronic and signals intelligence -- to find out, and they told me what they knew. But the people I worked with at CIA said, "Why did you call them? You have everything you need right here." Well, I didn't. It's so arrogant, to say you can't learn from others. But this is the culture. And it's even worse at NSA.

Barbara Koeppel is a Washington-based investigative reporter. This article has been slightly edited for space; subscribe to The Washington Spectator to read the second part of this report, addressing evidence of corruption that Thomas Drake turned over to investigators.

CONTINUE Reading Full Story HERE...

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/washington-spectator/nsa-analyst-we-could-have_b_1513494.html?view=print&comm_ref=false

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]

 

FLASH--I/Cy-WAR - SWG(A) - CTC Whitewashing Iran / al Qaeda-Connections?--LD

-FLASH- LIMITED DISSEMINATION

US/1; ATTN: US/5; IS/[redacted]

[ed.note: In May 1996, Osama bin LADEN sat down with Hezbollah Security Chief Imad Mugnieyah, mastermind of the Beirut Marine Barracks bombing, for an all-night Khartoum pow-wow (apologies, Member Bearfighter). The two stayed up, swilling tea and reminiscing about the 241 US Marines slaughtered in the 1983 Beirut barracks attack and their FIRST Joint Terror Venture in 1993 Mogadishu, wherein 18 Rangers and DELTA Operators were killed and their bodies dragged through the trash-strewn, red-dust alleyways...CTC Abbottabad documents ATTACHED.]

CTC whitewashing Iran/al Qaeda connections?

Posted: 06 May 2012 07:44 AM PDT

Some documents captured in the bin Laden raid have been declassified and released along with some analysis by the Combatting Terrorism Center. They seem to think that there is no cooperation between al Qaeda and the Iranians, but base this on a small subset of the documents captured and ignoring considerable evidence that the Mullahs and AQ do a fair amount of the good work of jihad together. Tom Joscelyn considers this at the Long War Journal.

The CTC's report was based on a slim release of just 17 declassified documents, and only some of those deal with Iran. Thousands of other files seized during the Abbottabad raid have been translated but were not included in the CTC's release. The CTC's broad conclusion about Iran and al Qaeda is based on a narrow set of documents that focus on the abduction of an Iranian diplomat named Hesmatollah Atharzadeh and other unspecified covert activities. Al Qaeda had pressured Iran to speed up the release of al Qaeda operatives and family members in exchange for Atharzadeh's freedom. 

According to senior US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal, however, the documents dealing with this tense detainee exchange present just one window on a broader relationship. Other documents from bin Laden's files that were not included in the document release point to instances of collusion between al Qaeda and Iran.

So even among the documents from the raid itself there is evidence that they are working together, but the CTC says "nothing to see here move along". There is more readily available info about this cooperation as well, a lot of it from the Obama administration itself as they designated several partnerships between AQ and Iran as terrorists entities.

In a letter accompanying the CTC report, General John Abizaid cautioned that the 17 declassified documents released to the public "likely represent only a fraction of the materials reportedly taken from" bin Laden's compound. Abizaid also warned that the report should not be taken as a "definitive commentary on al Qaeda's evolution or the group's current status." Abizaid continued by explaining that "analysis based on captured documents alone is fraught with risk," and the documents "are most valuable when contextualized with information drawn from other sources." 

The CTC's analysts proceeded to ignore these cautionary remarks and issued a strongly-worded conclusion, based on a paltry set of documents, about Iran's relationship with al Qaeda. In the process, they ignored everything - including Yasin al Suri's network and the "agreement" between Iran and al Qaeda that allows it to exist on Iranian soil - that got in the way of their apparently preconceived conclusion.

A senior US intelligence official tells the Long War Journal that additional documents dealing with the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda were excluded from what the CTC was shown. Those documents are a "mixed bag," the official says, with some showing other "antagonistic" incidents and still others showing collusion.

Somehow the CTC is given only a few documents which seem to show that AQ and Iran are at odds. Who could have a vested interest in making sure there is no tie between the Mullahs, who only seek nukes for peaceful means, and the world's most prolific terror franchise? I'll answer that, our Campaigner in Chief who needs to neutralize the threat a nuked-up Iran presents to his re-election. So O's national security team cherry-picks a few things from the bin Laden stash to prove that point and then tasks the CTC with evaluating them so they have an AHA document to roll up real small and poke Mitt Romney in the eye with. "See, Iran and AQ hate each other. 

The Mullahs would never support terror". I think the 241 dead Marines from the Beirut bombing, and many other victims of the Iranians, would beg to differ if they could.

[190 US Citizens on Pan Am Fl-103, 21 DEC 1988; 241 Beirut, OCT 1983; 19 at Khobar Towers US military barracks, Dharan, Saudi Arabia, 22 JUN 1996; 18 at Mogadishu, 3-4 OCT 1993, for example…US/1]

Somebody at the CTC needs to stand up and answer why they would release something that completely ignores the blisteringly obvious and easily available info about Iran and AQ. Joscelyn's piece is headlined "Analysis: Spinning Iran & al Qaeda Part 1". I will be anxiously awaiting the follow ups and a deeper look at what CTC is up to, and more importantly what the Iranians and AQ are up to.

 

-FLASH- OPEN SOURCE

US/1; ATTN:

Al Qaida Papers Highlight Tense Dealings With Iran

By: Brian Murphy, Associated Press

05/07/2012 ( 6:45am)

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — In the rigid enemy-or-ally world view of Osama bin Laden and his chief lieutenants, Iran occupied a spot somewhere in between — a state seen as arrogant, enigmatic and driven by self interest, according to newly released al-Qaida documents. 

Yet there is also a sense that al-Qaida recognizes the importance of Iran's role in the region and the need to keep some level of dialogue. 

The papers — seized in last year's raid on bin Laden's Pakistan hide-out and posted online Thursday by the U.S. Army's Combating Terrorism Center — portray al-Qaida's relations with Iran as clouded by deep mutual distrust and sharply divergent interests. 

A June 2009 al-Qaida memo — possibly to bin Laden — refers to the Iranian government as "criminals" in a no-holds bashing of its opaque and unpredictable policies. 

"The criminals did not send us any letter," wrote al-Qaida's top Afghanistan commander, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, about the earlier kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat in Pakistan that was believed carried out by militants linked to al-Qaida. 

"Such behavior is, of course, not unusual for (the Iranians); indeed it is typical of their mindset and methods," continued al-Rahman, who was killed the following year in a CIA drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. "They do not wish to appear to be negotiating with us or responding to our pressures." 

In one narrow sense, al-Qaida and the West share this much: exasperation over Tehran's shifting and often contradictory messages that extend all the way to talks over its nuclear program. 

The full extent of the interplay between Iran and al-Qaida remains unclear to Western policymakers. But the newly disclosed documents reinforce the long-held consensus that there is little common ground. 

Al-Qaida operatives — and even bin Laden relatives — used Iran as an escape route during the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11. attacks. 

Iran was not willing to be an open passageway, however. Dozens of top al-Qaida figures, including one of bin Laden's sons, Omar, were placed under house arrest-style detention. Many were later released, but several high-ranking al-Qaida figures are believed to remain in Iran under close surveillance, including the network's most senior military strategist, Saif al-Adel, one of the alleged masterminds of the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa. 

In 2010, another of bin Laden's sons, Khalid, sent a letter to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claiming that his relatives were mistreated and "beaten and silenced." Al-Qaida's branch in North Africa issued a warning to Iran over the matter. Khalid was among those killed in the U.S. raid on bin Laden's compound in Pakistan a year ago. 

The reasons behind the mutual suspicions cut across many of the region's main flashpoints. 

Iran was a major foe of Afghanistan's Taliban, which sheltered al-Qaida before the Sept. 11 attacks and remains its close ally. In 1998, Sunni-led Taliban forces overran Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan and were accused of killing eight Iranian diplomats as well as Afghans with cultural and religious ties to Iran, a Shiite power.

In Iraq, Sunni insurgents backed by al-Qaida often targeted Shiites in attempts to trigger an all-out civil war during the occupation by American forces. 

Some hard-line militants backing al-Qaida — which is made up almost entirely of Islam's majority Sunnis — consider Islam's Shiite branch as heretical and view Iran's regional ambitions as a greater threat than the West. Last year, the al-Qaida faction in Yemen declared "holy war" against Shiite rebels that get apparent indirect support from Tehran. 

Iran, meanwhile, is acutely aware of the consequences if it is perceived as accommodating toward al-Qaida. Key Iranian allies such as Russia and China tolerate Tehran's backing for anti-Israel militant groups led by Hamas and Hezbollah, but any major concessions to al-Qaida would risk crippling blows to Iran's strategic networks. 

A possible motive for keeping the al-Qaida figures under Iranian custody is as insurance against possible retaliation attacks by the terror group. Also they could be used as bargaining chips with the West. In 2003, Iran received rare Western praise after giving the U.N. Security Council the names of 225 al-Qaida suspects detained after illegally crossing into Iran. The suspects were later deported to their countries in the Middle East, Europe and Africa.

The list included Yemen-born Naser Abdel Karim al-Wahishi, bin Laden's former private secretary, who was sent to his homeland and later escaped prison and helps lead the group al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Another, according to the newly released documents, was Salim al-Misri, who is believed to have received explosives training from Hezbollah. 

The most direct contact between Iran and the al-Qaida leadership may have come during eventual negotiations in late 2009 to free the kidnapped diplomat, Heshmatollah Attarzadeh, who was held for nearly 15 months and released in March 2010. 

Western officials believe that al-Qaida, in return for its help in freeing Attarzadeh, won the release of dozens of al-Qaida operatives and bin Laden family members, and better treatment for others remaining in Iranian custody. 

In his June 2009 letter, the al-Qaida commander al-Rahman claimed the terror group outmaneuvered Iran's envoys during the talks over "their friend" Attarzadeh. 

"Our efforts, which included escalating a political and media campaign, the threats we made, the kidnapping of their friend ... and other reasons that scared them," he wrote, "(were) among the reasons that led them to expedite" the release of the al-Qaida detainees. Continue Reading FULL Story HERE...

 

http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/al-qaida-papers-highlight-tense-dealings-with-iran/34e4ecb637ef78aaa325bd78d2f408e1.html

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The Long War Journal: Analysis: Nearly all of bin Laden's documents should be released

Written by Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio

 May 3, 2012 11:55 AM -- The Long War Journal

Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/05/analysis_nearly_all.php

Here at the Long War Journal, we have been anxiously awaiting the release of the documents captured in Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad, Pakistan compound one year ago. According to informed US intelligence officials, thousands of documents were taken from bin Laden's lair, as was video and other types of media.

Today, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point released translations of a grand total of "17 declassified documents...totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in English translation." 

This is a paltry subset of the documents and media captured. 

We think that nearly all of Osama bin Laden's files should be declassified and released to the public - not just a tiny fraction of them. In this case, there are no sources and methods to protect. Everyone knows how and when the captured files were obtained.

There is undoubtedly information contained in the files that is still operationally relevant, and exceptions to declassification can be made in some cases. 

Overall, however, the government should declassify and release nearly all of bin Laden's files. Some of the files were authored more than a decade ago, yet none of those dated documents were released today. The earliest document released by CTC is dated September 2006. This means that any documents pertaining to the planning of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Oct. 12, 2000 USS Cole bombing, and the Aug. 7, 1998 embassy bombings were not released. Yet, these are the types of documents that deal directly with al Qaeda's assault on American interests that precipitated more than a decade of controversial counterterrorism measures and wars.

It is clear from the media's reporting on the documents that some journalists have either been shown, or informed of, many more documents than those released today. And those documents produce intriguing leads for understanding al Qaeda. There is no reason to think that this reporting has jeopardized security in any way. Accordingly, the documents underlying that reporting should be released.

Consider two examples. 

First, some of the documents reportedly indicate that Osama bin Laden had a hand in planning the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, which were executed by Lashkar-e-Taiba, an al Qaeda ally that is also closely tied to the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. [See LWJ report, Osama bin Laden helped plan Mumbai attacks.] The source for this reporting is Bruce Riedel, a former advisor to President Obama, who was apparently briefed on bin Laden's documents or shown them.

None of the documents pertaining to Osama bin Laden's reported role in the Mumbai attacks were released today. Yet, these documents may have a direct bearing on bin Laden's relationships with various elements of the Pakistani state. 

Second, the Guardian (UK) has reported that the files "show a close working relationship between top al Qaeda leaders and Mullah Omar, the overall commander of the Taliban, including frequent discussions of joint operations against NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Afghan government and targets in Pakistan." One of the Guardian's sources says that the files indicate a "very considerable degree of ideological convergence" between the Taliban and al Qaeda.

These documents were not released either, even though (if the reporting on them is accurate) they could shed important light on the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda.

In some cases the documents released by the CTC are not even the complete document, but instead "part" of longer correspondences.

While the 17 documents released today do contain interesting pieces of information, which The Long War Journal will be reporting on, no analyst can draw any firm conclusions about al Qaeda's operations and alliances solely from them. The documents must be compared to other available information and, more importantly, to other documents from Osama bin Laden's extensive files that have not been released.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/05/analysis_nearly_all-print.php

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]

JUDITH MILLER: Is the war on terror over? - Najibullah Zazi Recruit CONVICTED in NYC...

-  OPEN SOURCE

US/1; ATTN: RT/66; US/12; TPS/2; CID/2; OSINT/1 &2; JAG/1; US/17; HST/2; VADM/2; VS/2

by Judith Miller
Fox News
April 30, 2012

http://www.judithmiller.com/11628/war-on-terror-over

"The war on terror is over." That's what a senior State Department official told the National Journal in light of the Arab spring uprisings and the killing of Usama Bin Laden.

The article's ink was barely dry when a White House spokesman corrected the record. The State Department official had misspoken: President Obama's "war on Al Qaeda" was being fought furiously, and would continue.

In fact, Obama rejected George W. Bush's war on all of the violent Islamists and terrorists who might threaten America– his "Global War on Terror" – back in 2009. Instead, he had embraced a more intensely focused "war on Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and adherents."

That this more concentrated war continues was crystal clear during a trial last week in Brooklyn featuring Najibullah Zazi, the home-grown mastermind of the 2009 Al-Qaeda plot to bomb New York's subways. The suicide strike might have been the deadliest attack on American soil since 9/11 had the FBI and NYPD not thwarted it, police say. While Zazi and a fellow home-grown militant from Queens pleaded guilty to terror charges and testified for the government, a third alleged conspirator, Adis Medunjanin, denied guilt.

The testimony against him was an unsettling reminder that the war on terror, or Al Qaeda, or whatever else the administration calls it remains decidedly unfinished business.

That, too, was the message from John Brennan, President Obama's senior counter-terrorism adviser, who visited New York City as the trial was getting underway.

Brennan warned in a speech to the NYPD that Al Qaeda and other violent jihadis still threatened America. If America wanted to avoid "another devastating attack," it could not afford to drop its guard, he said. While hundreds of key Al Qaeda operatives had been killed and its abilities severely degraded, Al Qaeda still had "several hundred" members in Pakistan and another "hundred" or so in Afghanistan. Washington remained alarmed not only about Al Qaeda "core" but also about its metastasized affiliates and adherents – first among them, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or AQAP.

AQAP, Al Qaeda's "most active operational franchise," now had over a thousand members in Yemen, he said. Al Qaeda branches and affiliates and like-minded militants might also develop international agendas and capabilities. Noting the formal merger between the Somali militant group al Shabaab and Al Qaeda only two months ago, he said that Al Shabaab was now committed to Al Qaeda's campaign of international terrorism. Another Al-Qaeda affiliate in North Africa was now operating in Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Mali.

          [AQIM, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreeb]

There was no shortage of counter-terrorism frustrations, he added -- the millions of dollars that European states have paid to ransom nationals held hostage; concern that terrorists might acquire Libyan weapons from unsecured stockpiles: stopping terrorists from gravitating towards lawless areas in Egypt's Sinai near Israel; the possibility that Al Qaeda might fill a political vacuum in Syria.

Preventing Al Qaeda from capitalizing on the chaos of the Arab Spring would require "one, two, three years" of intense focus, Brennan warned.

At home, he worried about the proliferation of homegrown militant loners, inherently more difficult to detect and stop than radical groups. The growing sophistication of AQ bombs, the result of a generation of militants schooled in Iraq and Afghanistan, could also threaten Americans in the coming decade.

In a press conference after his speech, Brennan praised the NYPD's counter-terrorism work, asserting that New York's finest had struck an "appropriate" balance between protecting the city and its citizens' civil liberties.

The apparent endorsement meant much to the NYPD. The cops have been under fire from the AP, civil libertarians, and assorted Muslim activists over their aggressive Muslim surveillance program which has helped foil 14 plots against the city since Sept. 11. Critics say the department's efforts to understand the communities in which terrorists are likely to recruit or hide constitute racial profiling and violate civil liberties guarantees. The police insist that the program is legal and essential. Brennan's speech and subsequent remarks were widely seen as an endorsement of the NYPD's actions.

But Brennan had barely finished speaking when White House officials once again clarified his remarks by asserting that Brennan wasn't defending the NYPD's controversial Muslim surveillance program at all. "John never approved of described press accounts of alleged NYPD surveillance," a senior official said. Rather, Brennan was noting that "everyone in the counterterrorism and law enforcement community must make sure we are doing things consistent with the law."

I was standing next to Brennan when he was asked for his view of the NYPD's surveillance effort. Saying that he had known and worked with Police Commissioner Ray Kelly for years, Brennan said he did not think that Kelly would violate the law. "I have full confidence that the NYPD is doing things within the law, and has been responsible for keeping this city safe for the past decade," he said. The Muslim community was "part of the solution to the terrorist threat," he said, and needed to be "part of that effort."

On Sunday, the White House further clarified its earlier clarification. Brennan was indeed a "very strong supporter of the tremendous work done by NYPD on a daily basis keeping New York City safe," National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor wrote. But because the Justice Department has been "reviewing requests" that the NYPD surveillance program be investigated, Brennan "did not" and would not comment, "much less pass judgment, on any of those allegations or the Justice Department's pending review."

This is silly. For the administration's unwillingness to openly back the NYPD – or permit Brennan to do so – is not only at odds with Obama's own actions, it undercuts his impressive anti-terrorism accomplishments as "warrior in chief," as Peter Bergen, the author of a new book, "Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden — From 9/11 to Abbottabad," calls him.

Obama's counter-terrorism achievements cannot be denied. Thanks to his gutsy call, Usama bin Laden is dead. Ditto Anwar al-Awlaki, the de facto chief of AQAP. [go USA…]

Al Qaeda's "core" has been decimated due to increased American drone strikes in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Guantanamo is still open, despite his vow on his first day in office to close it.

Obama now asserts the right not only to target American citizens for assassination without judicial review if intelligence suggests they are involved in plotting terror, but to hold some terror suspects in jail indefinitely without trial.

This year, he revised guidelines to permit law enforcement to store records on people not suspected of terror from five months to 5 years.

I don't recall hearing demands for judicial review of such actions, however troubling to civil libertarians (including me) some of them, especially those affecting American citizens, may be.

In fact, despite his campaign pledges, Obama's counter-terrorism policy bears a striking resemblance to President Bush's, minus the waterboarding. That, I suspect, is precisely what troubles Obama's liberal base and some of the officials around him.

The administration seems to want to have things both ways – to bask in the glow of its counter-terrorism achievements, while downplaying the rhetoric, mind-set, and actions that a war on terror involves.

On one hand, his spokesmen try to placate his left-wing base – by initially calling the war on Al Qaeda "overseas contingency operations," (pathetic bureaucratic blather), by rejecting talk of a broader "war" on terror while waging one, and by trying to distance Obama from the NYPD's aggressive, successful tactics by calling for a judicial review of the cops' surveillance program.

On the other hand, they tout Obama's counter-terrorism victories in ads and interviews to combat assertions from the right that Obama is weak.

Such mixed signals, however, have often angered both left and right. And Mr. Obama has been able to sustain this cognitive dissonance only because his liberal base has resisted calling him on the contradictions between his pledges and his policies.

But in an election year, voters are demanding that Obama clarify where he stands on such issues as the balance between freedom and national security.

On Monday in a speech in Washington, Brennan outlined in detail the legal, strategic and ethical rationale for using drones to target and kill suspected terrorists – foreign and American –abroad, despite the fact that innocent civilians would continue to die.

It was an impressive, and to my mind, persuasive argument. -- Voters should demand more such genuine clarifications from the president and his team.

Better late than never.   [Ditto – US/1]

Related Topics:  Terrorism

 

U.S. to re-investigate al-Awlaki's ties to 9/11 hijackers

- OPEN SOURCE  US/1; ATTN:

TSP/2; HST/2; OSINT/2; FRG/2; BKYN/2; US/30; KL/1255

Member CONTRIBUTIONS

In an exclusive statement to Asharq Al-Awsat, US Department of Justice spokesman, Dean Boyd, has revealed that the US House Committee on Homeland Security – led by Congressman Peter King – has initiated an investigation into US-born Al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki’s possible involvement in the planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks.

Justice Department spokesman Dean Boyd told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the office of the US Attorney General has in fact already, in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigations [FBI], initiated a special investigation focusing on al-Awlaki’s possible involvement in the [9/11] attacks.”

He added that this investigation would “review all testimony and documents relating to 9/11, including e-mails and audio recordings made by al-Awlaki, as well as some of the lectures that he delivered at the Dar Al-Hijrah mosque in northern Virginia, in addition to reviewing the investigations conducted with him in the aftermath of the attacks.”

However Department of Justice spokesman Dean Boyd refused to comment on when the results of these investigations would be made public.

With the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks fast approaching, Fox News broke the story that the US House Committee on Homeland Security is initiating an investigation into radical Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, quoting a letter from committee chairman Peter King to US Attorney General Eric Holder.

Investigations confirm that Anwar al-Awlaki was in contact with three of the five hijackers on Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon, and the US House Committee on Homeland Security believes that this is more than a coincidence.

The US House Committee on Homeland Security is seeking to determine whether al-Awlaki was involved in the planning or execution of the 9/11 attacks – which are considered the worse terrorist attack on US soil – and the precise nature of his relationship with 3 of the 19 hijackers; namely Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Al-Hazmi, and Khalid al-Mihdhar.

In a three-page letter addressed to US Attorney General Eric Holder, which was sent in May, US Congressman King reveals that the congressional investigation will seek to determine two main issues, namely “to what extent Anwar al-Awlaki wittingly or unwittingly facilitated the plot of the 9/11 hijackers” and “to what extent al-Awlaki was an Al Qaeda operative, offering support to acts of terrorism, prior to 9/11.”

King writes that “there exists a well-documented factual basis for this congressional investigation” adding that “al-Awlaki’s status as an Al Qaeda operative is undeniable.”

The US Congressman relates a number of terrorist incidents that al-Awlaki has been involved in, including “on December 25, 2009, AQAP trained and directed Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to detonate a bomb on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 over Detroit, Michigan. On February 9, 2011, the National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael E. Leiter testified before the Committee on Homeland Security: ‘Anwar al-Awlaki, a dual US – Yemeni citizen and leader within AQAP, played a significant role in the attempted airliner attack.’”

King added “with the years of hindsight into al-Awlaki’s growing status within Al Qaeda, including his involvement in the Christmas Day 2009 attacks, there exists the critical need to reexamine the facts surrounding al-Awlaki and the 9/11 attacks.”

Citing further evidence for reopening the investigation into al-Awlaki, King asserted that “the 9/11 Commission Report suspected that al-Awlaki tasked Jordanian national Eyad al-Rababah in May 2001 to assist two 9/11 hijackers in finding an apartment.” He added that “in 1999, a prior investigation by the San Diego FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) tied al-Awlaki to 9/11 mastermind Osama Bin Laden. A known Al Qaeda procurement agent named Ziyad Khaleel had been in contact with al-Awlaki, and Khaleel had previously purchased a satellite phone for Osama Bin Laden.”

In addition to this, King claims that investigations reveal that “[9/11 hijackers] Al-Mindhar and Al-Hazmi attended the Rabat mosque [in San Diego] where al-Awlaki preached. In addition, al-Awlaki acted as a spiritual advisor to both.”

Additional information further strengthens the relationship between al-Awlaki and a number of the 9/11 hijackers, including the fact that “in January 2001, al-Awlaki relocated to Northern Virginia and began preaching at the Dar al Hijra mosque…four months later, on April 4, 2001, Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Hani Hanjour moved from Arizona to Northern Virginia.”

King concluded his letter to the US Attorney General by stressing that “given the greater collection of intelligence and integration of pertinent data since the attacks of 9/11, I believe that al-Awlaki may have played greater roles in the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as the other terrorist plots, than those of which we have been previously aware. Accordingly, I request the full assistance of the Department of Justice in carrying out this inquiry.”

US born Al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki has been implicated in a number of terrorist plots against the US, most notably the 2009 “Christmas Day attacks” and the Fort Hood shootings. He has been described by US politicians as “terrorist number one” and “the world’s most dangerous man.” He is currently believed to be in hiding in Yemen, and reports indicate that he is considered so dangerous that the Obama administration may have authorized killing him.

Posted by Marisol on August 22, 2011 6:56 AM

http://www.jihadwatch.org/2011/08/us-to-re-investigate-al-awlakis-ties-to-911-hijackers.html

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]

CyBER-BlackSEC--Ex-CIA-DDO Cofer Black on Cybersecurity at BlackHAT

- OPEN SOURCE  US/1; ATTN:

US/30; CID/2; US/12; RT/66; TSP/2; JAG/5; US/17

Former CIA official cites rise in government cybersecurity awareness

Michael S. Mimoso, Editorial Director
Published: 3 Aug 2011

LAS VEGAS – Both white hat and black hat security researchers alike today received a sobering warning from the Central Intelligence Agency’s former director of operations: The opportunity has never been greater to foster government cybersecurity awareness, now that the threat paradigm at a national defense level has evolved to include cybersecurity.

Cyber is going to be a key component of future conflict against nations or terror groups.

Cofer Black, former director of operations, Central Intelligence Agency

During a keynote address at the Black Hat 2011 conference, Cofer Black urged the security community to influence and educate government decision makers, many of whom are ignorant of the threats posed by cybercriminals and nations carrying out online attacks that target major corporations, government agencies and the defense industry.

“The issues that you’re involved in are today are of great value to decision makers,” Black stressed. “That is huge.”

Black said cybersecurity is prominent among the different categories, alongside kinetic and bacteriological attacks, featured the government’s ongoing threat assessments. As a comparison, he said during the Cold War, intelligence agencies progressed from highlighting potential chemical attacks, to later emphasizing bacteriological, radiological and nuclear attacks.

Black spent 28 years working for the CIA and was appointed director of the agency’s Counterterrorist Center in 1999 and coordinator for counterterrorism for the Department of State. He’s seen the threat of the Cold War, the rise of terrorism and now threats to industry and national security from online attacks. He cautioned that the signs are present and discussions are being held that allow for the contingency that physical, kinetic attacks could accompany serious hacks.

“I am here to tell you the Stuxnet attack is the rubicon of our future,” Black said. “I can’t say I understand how it was executed, but the important point is this is expensive to pull off, which means a nation-state was involved. Another important point is, things happening in your world may lead to physical destruction of national resources. This is huge.”

Responses to cyberattacks, however, are tricky because of the difficulty in tracing the origin of attacks and the lack of international coordination in such cases.
 
“Cyber is going to be a key component of future conflict against nations or terror groups,” Black said. “The problem is decision makers don’t understand the threats completely because they have not personally experienced them. They may hear it, but they don’t believe it.”

Black’s keynote comes a little more than a month before the tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington. Black drew parallels between the intelligence gathered pre-9/11 and what is happening with cybersecurity today.

In the years and months leading up to September 11, Black recalls the dismissive attitude decision makers had about Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, viewing the terror group and its leader as more a of financier of terror, and not an initiator. The threat from Al Qaeda was labeled overblown inside some government circles and by the press as well. This remained the case, even as attacks escalated against Americans overseas, including the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and in October 2000 against the U.S.S. Cole.

Black Hat 2011

See all our news coverage and exclusive videos from Black Hat 2011.

Black recalls advising the Bush administration as the transference of power from the Clinton administration began, that terrorism would be its greatest threat. However, Black said, there was no personal experience, no validation of the threat, and it was downplayed. In the summer of 2001, as the volume of intelligence grew about a major impending attack on the U.S., decision makers were briefed and advised to go to a “war footing”, yet, Black said, there were delays in taking action because the threat had yet to be validated.

“Men’s minds have difficulty adapting to things they have not personally experienced,” Black said.

Black’s point is the lead-up to 9/11 may be analogous to what’s happening with targeted persistent attacks carried out against the defense industry and other high-profile targets.

“The validation of that threat will come into your world,” Black said. “There is an analogy to the tech world in all of this and the situation in your world is far more challenging than you may appreciate.”

Related Topics: Security Awareness Training and Internal Threats-Information, Security Industry Market Trends, Predictions and Forecasts, Information Security Laws, Investigations and Ethics, VIEW ALL TAGS

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/2240039214/Former-CIA-official-cites-rise-in-government-cybersecurity-awareness

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]