Christopher Hitchens: From Abbottabad to Worse--OS

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Politics - July 2011

From Abbottabad to Worse

Hating the United States—which funds Islamabad’s army and nuclear program to the humiliating tune of $3 billion a year—Pakistan takes its twisted, cowardly revenge by harboring the likes of the late Osama bin Laden. But the hypocrisy is mutual, and the shame should be shared.

By Christopher Hitchens

Salman Rushdie’s upsettingly brilliant psycho-profile of Pakistan, in his 1983 novel, Shame, rightly laid emphasis on the crucial part played by sexual repression in the Islamic republic. And that was before the Talibanization of Afghanistan, and of much of Pakistan, too. Let me try to summarize and update the situation like this: Here is a society where rape is not a crime. It is a punishment. Women can be sentenced to be raped, by tribal and religious kangaroo courts, if even a rumor of their immodesty brings shame on their menfolk.

In such an obscenely distorted context, the counterpart term to shame—which is the noble word “honor”—becomes most commonly associated with the word “killing.” Moral courage consists of the willingness to butcher your own daughter.

If the most elemental of human instincts becomes warped in this bizarre manner, other morbid symptoms will disclose themselves as well. Thus, President Asif Ali Zardari cringes daily in front of the forces who openly murdered his wife, Benazir Bhutto, and who then contemptuously ordered the crime scene cleansed with fire hoses, as if to spit even on the pretense of an investigation. A man so lacking in pride—indeed lacking in manliness—will seek desperately to compensate in other ways.

Swelling his puny chest even more, he promises to resist the mighty United States, and to defend Pakistan’s holy “sovereignty.” This puffery and posing might perhaps possess a rag of credibility if he and his fellow middlemen were not avidly ingesting $3 billion worth of American subsidies every year.

There’s absolutely no mystery to the “Why do they hate us?” question, at least as it arises in Pakistan. They hate us because they owe us, and are dependent upon us. The two main symbols of Pakistan’s pride—its army and its nuclear program—are wholly parasitic on American indulgence and patronage. But, as I wrote for Vanity Fair in late 2001, in a long report from this degraded country, that army and those nukes are intended to be reserved for war against the neighboring democracy of India. Our bought-and-paid-for pretense that they have any other true purpose has led to a rancid, resentful official hypocrisy, and to a state policy of revenge, large and petty, on the big, rich, dumb Americans who foot the bill. If Pakistan were a character, it would resemble the one described by Alexander Pope in his Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot:

             FROM the VanityFAIR Archives:

• “Terrorism’s Dark Master” (Peter Bergen, November 2001)

• The Oral History of Osama bin Laden (Peter Bergen, January 2006)

• Osama bin Laden versus the world (Peter Bergen, January 2011)

• Pakistan: “On the Frontiers of Apocalypse” (Christopher Hitchens, January 2002)

• David Rose sifts through “The Osama Files” (January 2002)

Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike.
Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike:
Alike reserved to blame, or to commend,
A timorous foe, and a suspicious friend …
So well-bred Spaniels civilly delight
In mumbling of the game they dare not bite.

There’s an old cliché in client-state relations, about the tail wagging the dog, but have we really considered what it means when we actually are the tail, and the dog is our goddam lapdog? The lapdog’s surreptitious revenge has consisted in the provision of kennels for attack dogs. Everybody knew that the Taliban was originally an instrument for Pakistani colonization of Afghanistan.

Everybody knew that al-Qaeda forces were being sheltered in the Pakistani frontier town of Quetta, and that Khalid Sheikh Muhammed was found hiding in Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistani Army. 

Bernard-Henri Lévy once even produced a damning time line showing that every Pakistani “capture” of a wanted jihadist had occurred the week immediately preceding a vote in Congress on subventions to the government in Islamabad. But not even I was cynical enough to believe that Osama bin Laden himself would be given a villa in a Pakistani garrison town on Islamabad’s periphery. I quote below from a letter written by my Pakistani friend Irfan Khawaja, a teacher of philosophy at Felician College, in New Jersey. He sent it to me in anguish just after bin Laden, who claimed to love death more than life, had met his presumably desired rendezvous:

I find, however, that I can’t quite share in the sense of jubilation. I never believed that bin Laden was living in some hideaway “in the tribal areas.” But to learn that he was living in Abbottabad, after Khalid Sheikh Muhammed was discovered in Rawalpindi, is really too much for me. I don’t feel jubilation. I feel a personal, ineradicable sense of betrayal. For ten years, I’ve watched members of my own family taking to the streets, protesting the US military presence in northern Pakistan and the drone strikes etc. They stood there and prattled on and on about “Pakistan’s sovereignty,” and the supposed invasion of it by US forces.

Well, what fucking sovereignty? What fucking sovereignty were these people “protecting”? It’s bad enough that the Pakistani army lacks sovereignty over the tribal area and can’t control it when the country’s own life depends upon it. But that bin Laden was living in the Pakistani equivalent of Annapolis, MD …

You will notice that Irfan is here registering genuine shame, in the sense of proper outrage and personal embarrassment, and not some vicarious parody of emotion where it is always others—usually powerless women—who are supposedly bringing the shame on you.

If the Pakistani authorities had admitted what they were doing, and claimed the right to offer safe haven to al-Qaeda and the Taliban on their own soil, then the boast of “sovereignty” might at least have had some grotesque validity to it. But they were too cowardly and duplicitous for that. And they also wanted to be paid, lavishly and regularly, for pretending to fight against those very forces. Has any state ever been, in the strict sense of the term, more shameless?

Over the years, I have written many pages about the sick relationship between the United States and various Third World client regimes, many of which turned out to be false friends as well as highly discreditable ones. General Pinochet, of Chile, had the unbelievable nerve to explode a car bomb in rush-hour traffic in Washington, D.C., in 1976, murdering a political rival and his American colleague. The South Vietnamese military junta made a private deal to sabotage the Paris peace talks in 1968, in order to benefit the electoral chances of Richard Nixon. Dirty money from the Shah of Iran and the Greek dictatorship made its way at different times into our electoral process.

[PLUS: Ferdinand Marcos, various Saudis, the Sultan of Brunei, the Indonesian Riady family, and the PEOPLES’ REPUBLIC of CHINA--to name but a few more.] 

Israeli religious extremists demand American protection and then denounce us for “interference” if we demur politely about colonization of the West Bank. But our blatant manipulation by Pakistan is the most diseased and rotten thing in which the United States has ever involved itself. And it is also, in the grossest way, a violation of our sovereignty. Pakistan routinely—by the dispatch of barely deniable death squads across its borders, to such locations as the Taj Hotel in Mumbai—injures the sovereignty of India as well as Afghanistan. But you might call that a traditional form of violation.

In our case, Pakistan ingratiatingly and silkily invites young Americans to one of the vilest and most dangerous regions on earth, there to fight and die as its allies, all the while sharpening a blade for their backs. “The smiler with the knife under the cloak,” as Chaucer phrased it so frigidly. (At our feet, and at our throat: Perfectly symbolic of the underhanded duality between the mercenary and the sycophant was the decision of the Pakistani intelligence services, in revenge for the Abbottabad raid, to disclose the name of the C.I.A. station chief in Islamabad.)


This is well beyond humiliation. It makes us a prisoner of the shame, and co-responsible for it. The United States was shamed when it became the Cold War armorer of the Ayub Khan dictatorship in the 1950s and 1960s. It was shamed even more when it supported General Yahya Khan’s mass murder in Bangladesh in 1971: a Muslim-on-Muslim genocide that crashingly demonstrated the utter failure of a state based on a single religion. We were then played for suckers by yet another military boss in the form of General Zia-ul-Haq, who leveraged anti-Communism in Afghanistan into a free pass for the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the open mockery of the nonproliferation treaty. 

[PLUS: Orchestrating the transfer of an advanced F-16 fighter and technology to CHINA.]

By the start of the millennium, Pakistan had become home to a Walmart of fissile material, traded as far away as Libya and North Korea by the state-subsidized nuclear entrepreneur A. Q. Khan, the country’s nearest approach (which in itself tells you something) to a national hero. Among the scientists working on the project were three named sympathizers of the Taliban. And that gigantic betrayal, too, was uncovered only by chance.

CONTINUE Reading FULL Article HERE...

....Why was the raid on Abbottabad so rightly called “daring”? Because it had to be conducted under the radar of the Pakistani Air Force, which “scrambled” its jets and would have brought the Black Hawks down if it could. That this is true is bad enough in all conscience. That we should still be submitting ourselves to lectures and admonitions from General Kayani is beyond shameful.

Read More http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/07/osama-bin-laden-201107?printable=true#ixzz1OT7iOMbV

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]

ProPublica.com Coverage of PAKISTAN's Terror Connections--OS

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Watch the full episode. See more FRONTLINE.

Use Our Coverage to Understand Pakistan’s Suspected Terror Connections and the 2008 Mumbai Attacks

by Braden Goyette
ProPublica, June 6, 2011, 1:04 p.m

ProPublica's Sebastian Rotella has spent more than a year investigating suspected links between Pakistan's intelligence service and terrorist groups as well as the failure of the U.S. government to detect the growing threat posed by the Lashkar-i-Taiba militant group. He has traveled overseas and around the United States to track down secret documents and conduct exclusive interviews with counterterrorism officials and people close to David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American who has confessed to doing reconnaissance work in Mumbai for Lashkar.

Rotella has written more than 33,000 words on the subject, which might seem a bit overwhelming if you're a newcomer to the subject. So here's an overview of the basics to get you started, plus links to stories that can help you dig even deeper. 

What's the significance of the terrorism trial going on in Chicago? 

The United States has indicted seven suspects in the three-day string of terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and a follow-up plot in Denmark. The attacks killed 166 people and wounded 308. Because six of the dead were U.S. citizens, federal prosecutors and the FBI are required by law to pursue an investigation.

The Mumbai massacre is the most spectacular strike to date by Lashkar-i-Taiba, and the first Lashkar attack that has expressly targeted Westerners. Prior to the Mumbai attacks, many U.S. officials assumed Lashkar's energies were focused on India in the struggle over the territory of Kashmir. 

Some worry that publicity from the trial could interfere with the U.S. government's goal of keeping Pakistan as an ally. 

For the latest from the trial, keep an eye on our investigation page. 

Who are the major players in the trial? 

Tahawwur Rana is on trial as an accomplice in the Mumbai attack and the Denmark plot. Prosecutors allege that he allowed Headley to use his business as a cover while performing reconnaissance missions related to Mumbai. Rana has pleaded not guilty. For more on Rana, and Rotella's exclusive interview with Rana's wife, see this piece produced by our partners at PBS Frontline. 

The star witness against Rana is his boyhood friend David Coleman Headley, a former DEA informant who has confessed to doing reconnaissance work for Lashkar in the years leading up to the Mumbai attacks. 

Headley also did reconnaissance for al Qaeda in a failed plot to behead employees of a Danish newspaper that published a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad. After Headley's arrest in 2009, he offered to help the FBI capture other terrorists as he sought a deal to avoid the death penalty. Headley's testimony points to a close alliance between Lashkar and ISI officers. Headley, 50, has proven a great asset to the terror groups he has worked with because of his atypical profile: his American passport and Western appearance, his age and language skills, his ability to operate in the West and South Asia and his extensive contacts in Pakistan's elite and the criminal underworld. 

He is possibly the most colorful character to emerge at the center of a U.S. terrorism trial. You can read more about his background here, and about the credibility of his testimony here. 

Two alleged masterminds named in the indictment, Sajid Mir and a man known only as Major Iqbal, are suspected of having ISI connections. Mir was picked by Lashkar-i-Taiba to organize the Mumbai massacre: he chose targets, oversaw the plotting and directed the militants carrying out the attacks by phone from Pakistan. Some anti-terrorism officials say he is a former officer in the Pakistani military or the ISI, though others doubt he was actually in the military. Rotella put together a compelling portrait of Mir and the Mumbai attacks, "The Man Behind Mumbai." It's also available as a Kindle Single. 

Major Iqbal is a suspected ISI officer who worked as a liaison to Lashkar. Headley identifies him as his ISI handler, saying Iqbal worked in tandem with Mir, Headley's Lashkar handler. Iqbal trained Headley in espionage skills separately from Lashkar, directed and funded his reconnaissance and played a key role in planning the Mumbai attack, according to trial testimony. 

What is Laskhar-i-Taiba? 

Lashkar was founded in the 1980s and fought against Soviet incursions into Afghanistan, an effort supported by the U.S and Pakistan. Pakistan's military used the group as a strategic ally in its fight with India over Kashmir, working so closely with Lashkar that the military often assigned officers to work with the militant group. The Pakistani government officially outlawed Lashkar after a 2001 attack on India's parliament. But David Coleman Headley testified that in the years leading up to the Mumbai attacks the ISI retained a close alliance with Lashkar and its officers helped screen and train recruits from overseas at Lashkar training camps. 

Lashkar is enmeshed with other terror groups in the region. Its founder, Hafiz Saeed, was a mentor to Osama bin Laden and helped him found a group that was a precursor to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, for its part, works with the Pakistani Taliban. The Barcelona subway bombing plot of 2008 was believed to have been a joint venture by the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Mumbai investigation showed that a number of Lashkar fighters, including former Pakistani military officers, have defected to the Taliban and al Qaeda in recent years. 

Lashkar has long served as an ally for al Qaeda, providing everything from safe houses for leaders to a kind of training ground for aspiring holy warriors. Rotella reported that several led al Qaeda plots against New York and London. 

After 9/11, most U.S. counterterror officials dismissed Lashkar as a potential threat because it seemed focused on India. But Lashkar increasingly seems to pose a unique threat because of its para-military discipline, popularity in Pakistan, ample war chest and longtime ties to the Pakistani intelligence service.
Jean-Louis Bruguière, a French judge who investigated Mir, said "Lashkar is not just a tool of the ISI, but an ally of al Qaeda that participates in its global jihad. Today Pakistan is the heart of the terrorist threat. And it may be too late to do anything about it." 

For a rundown of Lashkar's origins and a fuller account of the plot behind the Mumbai attacks, read "The Man Behind Mumbai." 

How did the U.S. handle warnings about Headley? 

Beginning in 2001, five people close to Headley warned U.S. officials about his dealings with terrorists, including two of Headley's three wives. They described his radicalization, his training in Lashkar camps and his apparent missions in Pakistan and India. But the officials said their allegations were too general, didn't point to a particular plot and could have been motivated by personal grudges. Despite the repeated warnings about Headley's terrorist involvement, he wasn't arrested until 2009, 11 months after the Mumbai attacks. Headley served as a DEA informant starting in the late 1990s and testimony revealed that he was still an informant when he trained in Lashkar's camps in 2002. Mysteries persist about the nature of his work as an informant, when it ended and whether it shielded him from more aggressive scrutiny by the FBI. 

See this story for details on the substance of the tips, and how they were handled by U.S. officials. As a result of Rotella's stories last October, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reviewed the U.S. government's handling of Headley. Its findings have not been made public. 

What happened with the Denmark plot? 

Headley testified in Chicago that the plot to attack the Danish newspaper was launched by the ISI and Lashkar, but they shelved the project after his first reconnaissance trip. The plot then shifted to al Qaeda, with kingpin Ilyas Kashmiri directing and funding Headley's reconnaissance and attempts to recruit an attack team in Europe. News reports from Pakistan this weekend indicate Kashmiri may have been killed in a U.S. missile strike, but U.S. officials have not yet confirmed that. ProPublica and PBS Frontline are working on a documentary about the Mumbai and Denmark terror plots that will air in the fall. 

http://www.propublica.org/article/use-our-coverage-to-understand-pakistans-terror-connections