Pentagon Report Flags Latest in Long History of Flawed Body Armor Testing

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The ProPublica Blog

by Marian Wang

ProPublica, Aug. 18, 2011, 1:41 p.m

The Army failed to properly test a critical component of body armor and can’t say for sure that 5 million pieces of the bullet-stopping equipment offers sufficient protection for troops. Those are the findings contained in a new report [PDF] by the Pentagon’s inspector general. 

Tests for extreme temperature, altitude, and weathering were “routinely” eliminated or tweaked for the ceramic plates inside body armor, which are a “significant part of the soldier’s protection system," the report said. It looked at testing records for $2.5 billion in contracts awarded to armor manufacturers between 2004 and 2006. The inspector general did not conduct independent testing. 

The Pentagon also ceded too much authority to the defense contractors, the report concluded. Contractor employees performed “inherently governmental functions” such as evaluating test results to decide whether to accept or reject the products.

The Army responded that it has adopted the report’s recommendations and improved the process by which it tests body armor. Last year, it adopted a standard testing protocol that’s being used across the Defense Department. “The U.S. Army conducts rigorous and extensive testing of body armor to ensure that it meets U.S. Army standards and is safe for use by Soldiers in combat,” it said. 

But the report's findings are the latest in a series of revelations about inadequate testing and problematic procurement for body armor.

In the early days of the Iraq war, after initially limiting the distribution of new bulletproof armor to only soldiers on the front lines, the Army reversed course and scrambled to buy them for all troops in Iraq. But those orders took several months to get to the troops, even while U.S. allies that purchased body armor received their orders in just 12 days.

Then came a scathing 2006 Pentagon report, which found that of the U.S. Marines in Iraq killed by shots to the torso, at least 80 percent could perhaps have survived if they’d had extra body armor protecting their sides. That sent off another scramble by both the Marines and the Army to send over additional armor. The report also prompted calls from lawmakers for a review by the Pentagon’s inspector general.

In a subsequent 2009 rep­­ort [PDF], the Pentagon’s inspector general identified testing flaws in one order of ceramic inserts and recommended that the Army recall more than 16,000 of them. The Army maintained that the gear was safe but issued a recall anyway. That same year, the Army also decided to test the armor in its own laboratory instead of using private labs.

Two more reports this year build on those 2009 findings, expanding the inquiry to a total of 13 contracts. In addition to the latest report on the seven contracts for ceramic inserts, another report in January found that the testing done on 1.2 million outer vests for body armor—six contracts worth $434 million in all—also fell short of what was required [PDF].

http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/pentagon-report-flags-latest-in-long-history-of-flawed-body-armor-test

WHIPLASH Alert--Justice Department Retracts Court Filings That Undercut FBI's Anthrax Case

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[ed.note: It is now official: even the BlackNET can get whiplash…and migraines…

At least it doesn’t work at the DOJ, where all the USAMIID BlackLYOPHILIZERs are actually stored. Yesterday's original ProPublica/Frontline/McClatchy story is post on the BlackANX page http://blacknetintel.blogspot.com/p/blackanx.html]

 Justice Department Retracts Court Filings FBI’s Anthrax Case

by Greg Gordon, McClatchy Newspapers, Mike Wiser, FRONTLINE, and Stephen Engelberg, ProPublica July 19, 2011, 9:36 p.m.

This story was co-published with PBS Frontline and McClatchy.

WASHINGTON -- Rushing into court to undo a major blunder, Justice Department lawyers defending a civil suit Tuesday retracted statements that question the FBI's finding that a former Army microbiologist mailed the anthrax-filled letters that killed five people in 2001.

But the unusual seven-page correction, filed in federal court in Florida, does not erase testimony from government scientists who challenged the FBI's finding that the late Bruce Ivins was the perpetrator.

The department's legal dance stems from its two seemingly conflicting roles: backing up the FBI's finding that Ivins, who committed suicide in July 2008, was the killer; and defending an Army bio-weapons lab at Fort Detrick, Md., against allegations of negligence.

The department's Civil Division is attempting to limit federal liability over the death of the first anthrax victim, a Boca Raton, Fla., man whose family is seeking $50 million in damages for alleged negligence by the lab at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), where Ivins worked on anthrax vaccines.

In trying to minimize USAMRIID's liability, government lawyers have had to walk a fine line, because the FBI says Ivins produced the anthrax powder at the facility while the civil lawyers seemed to suggest it could have been prepared elsewhere.

Tuesday's retraction came a day after a collaborative report by McClatchy, the Public Broadcasting System's Frontline news magazine and ProPublica, disclosing what appeared to be an explosive Justice Department revelation.

In a legal filing last week, department lawyers in the civil case said that the lab lacked the "specialized equipment in a containment suite" needed for Ivins to have dried the deadly powder.

That and other statements raised hackles at the FBI and among prosecutors in the criminal case, leading to hurried huddles at the Justice Department.

In a statement Tuesday, department spokesman Dean Boyd said that Civil Division lawyers had submitted "inaccurate information" and that "the Justice Department and FBI stand behind their findings that Dr. Ivins had the necessary equipment in the containment suite" to produce the spores.

They noted that Ivins had ordered his own machine, known as a lyophilizer, that could be used for drying anthrax spores. The machine was labeled "property of Bruce Ivins" and was located in a nearby biocontainment suite.

Although it amended the filing, the Justice Department could not take back what government scientists had said in sworn depositions.

Stephen Little, a technician at the Army lab, was asked whether the equipment could have been used to make the dried spore preparation used in the letters.

"Not any equipment I have seen," Little replied.

Little said that there was "no way" Ivins could have moved the lyophilizer to the into the biocontainment suite, where Ivins' lab space was located.

"The thing is as big as a refrigerator," Little said.

Another scientist, Susan Welkos, said, "We don't have any way to produce the massive amount of (anthrax) material that would have been necessary to grow up and dry in a way that wouldn't have killed everybody in the institute."

Both quotations were highlighted by Justice Department lawyers in their submission to the court last week.

Friday's filing also said that Ivins sent anthrax from a flask in his lab—a flask that the FBI contends provided the parent material for the letter anthrax—to two outside laboratories, the Battelle Memorial Institute in West Jefferson, Ohio, and a lab operated by BioPort in Lansing, Mich.

The amended filing said that Ivins sent the spores only to Battelle, narrowing the number of parties who might have been considered suspects.

Boyd said that the department and the FBI "have never wavered from that view that Dr. Ivins mailed the anthrax letters."

Ivins overdosed on Tylenol and two other drugs not long after learning that federal prosecutors were preparing to indict him on capital murder charges.

It was unclear how the court filings by the Civil Division ended up so at odds with the narrative developed by prosecutors, and the department did not offer an explanation.

http://www.propublica.org/article/justice-department-retracts-court-filings-that-undercut-fbis-anthrax-case

[Information contained in BKNT E-mail is considered Attorney-Client and Attorney Work Product privileged, copyrighted and confidential. Views that may be expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of any government, agency, or news organization.]

ProPublica on Chicago Terrorism Trial & Pakistan Lessons?-

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Chicago Terrorism Trial: What We Learned, and Didn’t, About Pakistan’s Terror Connections

by Sebastian Rotella
ProPublica, June 9, 2011, 9:36 p.m

The terrorism trial of Tahawwur Rana, a minor accomplice whose trial ended Thursday in a guilty verdict on two of three counts, offered an extraordinary look into the underworld of terrorism and espionage in South Asia and had repercussions much closer to home.

The five days of testimony of confessed American terrorist and Pakistani spy David Coleman Headley were unprecedented in a U.S. courtroom. Headley delivered explosive revelations about how officers in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) funded, supported and directed the 2008 Mumbai attacks along with the Lashkar-i-Taiba militant group.

Because of his mix of front-line experience and high-level contacts, Headley's testimony was like a seminar in how terrorists communicate in code, do surveillance on targets and assemble plots while spies oversee the operations from the shadows like puppeteers.

The case also showed how a growing number of serving and former Pakistani military officers have put their lethal talents at the service of Lashkar, al-Qaida and other groups. It revealed the impunity with which ISI officers and terrorists alike operate in Pakistan even when they target Americans and other Westerners. (See our readers' guide to the trial.)

The evidence combined with the indictment of Headley's ISI handler in the murders of six American victims of the Mumbai attacks has worsened the already troubled U.S. Pakistani-relationship.

"The trial has been yet another bump in the road for U.S.-Pakistan relations," said Stephen Tankel, author of a forthcoming book titled Storming the World Stage: the Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba.

At the same time, the trial left enduring mysteries.

It did not answer questions about whether Sajid Mir, a Lashkar mastermind caught on tape directing the slaughter in Mumbai by phone, was once a Pakistani military officer. It did not explore the extent to which ISI chiefs beyond Headley's handler, known only as Major Iqbal, were aware of the Mumbai plot, which ultimately killed 166 people. Headley testified that he believed top ISI leadership was not aware, but he also said he thought Iqbal's commanding officer and his unit of the spy agency knew about the operation.

Finally, prosecutors managed to skirt two delicate and interconnected issues that the U.S. government refuses to discuss: Headley's role as a U.S. informant and the failure of the FBI to stop his terrorist activity despite at least six warnings during seven years. Headley revealed that he was simultaneously an extremist and an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration for at least two years and that he gathered counterterror intelligence as well as doing anti-drug work.

Headley testified that he stopped working for the DEA in September 2002, but that did not change contradictions and gaps in the U.S. government's official version. The DEA has stated that he was deactivated in early 2002, while other agencies have said he remained an informant until as late as 2005.

The lack of clarity reinforces suspicions that the U.S. government knew more about Headley than it has revealed and that his role as an informant shielded him from more aggressive scrutiny in the years before his arrest in October 2009.

"I don't feel we got the whole story about Headley as an informant from the Americans," said a European counterterror official involved in the investigation. "I believe he was a drug informant and also some other kind of informant."

The jury did not get the whole story either. Headley had already pleaded guilty to doing reconnaissance in Mumbai and for a plot in Denmark. The official focus of the trial was the narrower issue of charges of material support of terrorism against Rana, who owns an immigration consulting firm in Chicago. He was accused of supporting Headley's reconnaissance for the Mumbai and Denmark attacks and of overall support for Lashkar. Prosecutors charged that Rana let Headley open an office of the firm in Mumbai and use the business as cover for his surveillance in India and Denmark.

The verdict suggested a common-sense analysis by the jury. Headley testified that the Mumbai plot was a joint operation in which he was directed by Major Iqbal of the ISI and the Lashkar handler named Mir. The defense established that Rana communicated with Major Iqbal, but not any Lashkar masterminds. Rana's lawyers argued that Headley, Rana's boyhood friend, was a skilled manipulator who convinced Rana that he was doing intelligence for the ISI against India, Pakistan's arch-enemy, and kept him in the dark about the Mumbai plot.

The acquittal on the charge of supporting the Mumbai plot indicates that the jury accepted that argument. But they apparently rejected the idea that Rana remained a dupe once the carnage in India had happened. Headley soon enlisted Rana to assist his reconnaissance on a newspaper in Denmark that has become an internationally known target of terrorists after publishing caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005. Because Rana was a devout Muslim, it seems hard to believe he did not suspect anything at that point.

Rana's conviction is a small victory. Washington has been pressing Pakistan for more than a year to arrest Major Iqbal as well as Mir and a half-a-dozen other Lashkar chiefs who have been implicated as masterminds. Despite abundant evidence and the U.S. federal indictment, the Pakistani government has not pursued those fugitives. They are not in hiding and continue to be involved in terrorist plotting, U.S. investigators say.

Lashkar is simply too powerful and too close to the Pakistani security forces, according to Western and Indian counterterror officials. Pakistani officials fear that arresting major figures in Lashkar, which has not attacked the Pakistani state, could result in violent backlash and further instability.

"They think they have to leave these Lashkar cadres free to control the organization," an Indian anti-terror official said. "They are worried that if they move against them, it could be a civil-war situation."

http://www.propublica.org/article/chicago-terrorism-trial-what-we-learned-and-didnt

ProPublica.com Coverage of PAKISTAN's Terror Connections--OS

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Use Our Coverage to Understand Pakistan’s Suspected Terror Connections and the 2008 Mumbai Attacks

by Braden Goyette
ProPublica, June 6, 2011, 1:04 p.m

ProPublica's Sebastian Rotella has spent more than a year investigating suspected links between Pakistan's intelligence service and terrorist groups as well as the failure of the U.S. government to detect the growing threat posed by the Lashkar-i-Taiba militant group. He has traveled overseas and around the United States to track down secret documents and conduct exclusive interviews with counterterrorism officials and people close to David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American who has confessed to doing reconnaissance work in Mumbai for Lashkar.

Rotella has written more than 33,000 words on the subject, which might seem a bit overwhelming if you're a newcomer to the subject. So here's an overview of the basics to get you started, plus links to stories that can help you dig even deeper. 

What's the significance of the terrorism trial going on in Chicago? 

The United States has indicted seven suspects in the three-day string of terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and a follow-up plot in Denmark. The attacks killed 166 people and wounded 308. Because six of the dead were U.S. citizens, federal prosecutors and the FBI are required by law to pursue an investigation.

The Mumbai massacre is the most spectacular strike to date by Lashkar-i-Taiba, and the first Lashkar attack that has expressly targeted Westerners. Prior to the Mumbai attacks, many U.S. officials assumed Lashkar's energies were focused on India in the struggle over the territory of Kashmir. 

Some worry that publicity from the trial could interfere with the U.S. government's goal of keeping Pakistan as an ally. 

For the latest from the trial, keep an eye on our investigation page. 

Who are the major players in the trial? 

Tahawwur Rana is on trial as an accomplice in the Mumbai attack and the Denmark plot. Prosecutors allege that he allowed Headley to use his business as a cover while performing reconnaissance missions related to Mumbai. Rana has pleaded not guilty. For more on Rana, and Rotella's exclusive interview with Rana's wife, see this piece produced by our partners at PBS Frontline. 

The star witness against Rana is his boyhood friend David Coleman Headley, a former DEA informant who has confessed to doing reconnaissance work for Lashkar in the years leading up to the Mumbai attacks. 

Headley also did reconnaissance for al Qaeda in a failed plot to behead employees of a Danish newspaper that published a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad. After Headley's arrest in 2009, he offered to help the FBI capture other terrorists as he sought a deal to avoid the death penalty. Headley's testimony points to a close alliance between Lashkar and ISI officers. Headley, 50, has proven a great asset to the terror groups he has worked with because of his atypical profile: his American passport and Western appearance, his age and language skills, his ability to operate in the West and South Asia and his extensive contacts in Pakistan's elite and the criminal underworld. 

He is possibly the most colorful character to emerge at the center of a U.S. terrorism trial. You can read more about his background here, and about the credibility of his testimony here. 

Two alleged masterminds named in the indictment, Sajid Mir and a man known only as Major Iqbal, are suspected of having ISI connections. Mir was picked by Lashkar-i-Taiba to organize the Mumbai massacre: he chose targets, oversaw the plotting and directed the militants carrying out the attacks by phone from Pakistan. Some anti-terrorism officials say he is a former officer in the Pakistani military or the ISI, though others doubt he was actually in the military. Rotella put together a compelling portrait of Mir and the Mumbai attacks, "The Man Behind Mumbai." It's also available as a Kindle Single. 

Major Iqbal is a suspected ISI officer who worked as a liaison to Lashkar. Headley identifies him as his ISI handler, saying Iqbal worked in tandem with Mir, Headley's Lashkar handler. Iqbal trained Headley in espionage skills separately from Lashkar, directed and funded his reconnaissance and played a key role in planning the Mumbai attack, according to trial testimony. 

What is Laskhar-i-Taiba? 

Lashkar was founded in the 1980s and fought against Soviet incursions into Afghanistan, an effort supported by the U.S and Pakistan. Pakistan's military used the group as a strategic ally in its fight with India over Kashmir, working so closely with Lashkar that the military often assigned officers to work with the militant group. The Pakistani government officially outlawed Lashkar after a 2001 attack on India's parliament. But David Coleman Headley testified that in the years leading up to the Mumbai attacks the ISI retained a close alliance with Lashkar and its officers helped screen and train recruits from overseas at Lashkar training camps. 

Lashkar is enmeshed with other terror groups in the region. Its founder, Hafiz Saeed, was a mentor to Osama bin Laden and helped him found a group that was a precursor to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, for its part, works with the Pakistani Taliban. The Barcelona subway bombing plot of 2008 was believed to have been a joint venture by the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Mumbai investigation showed that a number of Lashkar fighters, including former Pakistani military officers, have defected to the Taliban and al Qaeda in recent years. 

Lashkar has long served as an ally for al Qaeda, providing everything from safe houses for leaders to a kind of training ground for aspiring holy warriors. Rotella reported that several led al Qaeda plots against New York and London. 

After 9/11, most U.S. counterterror officials dismissed Lashkar as a potential threat because it seemed focused on India. But Lashkar increasingly seems to pose a unique threat because of its para-military discipline, popularity in Pakistan, ample war chest and longtime ties to the Pakistani intelligence service.
Jean-Louis Bruguière, a French judge who investigated Mir, said "Lashkar is not just a tool of the ISI, but an ally of al Qaeda that participates in its global jihad. Today Pakistan is the heart of the terrorist threat. And it may be too late to do anything about it." 

For a rundown of Lashkar's origins and a fuller account of the plot behind the Mumbai attacks, read "The Man Behind Mumbai." 

How did the U.S. handle warnings about Headley? 

Beginning in 2001, five people close to Headley warned U.S. officials about his dealings with terrorists, including two of Headley's three wives. They described his radicalization, his training in Lashkar camps and his apparent missions in Pakistan and India. But the officials said their allegations were too general, didn't point to a particular plot and could have been motivated by personal grudges. Despite the repeated warnings about Headley's terrorist involvement, he wasn't arrested until 2009, 11 months after the Mumbai attacks. Headley served as a DEA informant starting in the late 1990s and testimony revealed that he was still an informant when he trained in Lashkar's camps in 2002. Mysteries persist about the nature of his work as an informant, when it ended and whether it shielded him from more aggressive scrutiny by the FBI. 

See this story for details on the substance of the tips, and how they were handled by U.S. officials. As a result of Rotella's stories last October, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reviewed the U.S. government's handling of Headley. Its findings have not been made public. 

What happened with the Denmark plot? 

Headley testified in Chicago that the plot to attack the Danish newspaper was launched by the ISI and Lashkar, but they shelved the project after his first reconnaissance trip. The plot then shifted to al Qaeda, with kingpin Ilyas Kashmiri directing and funding Headley's reconnaissance and attempts to recruit an attack team in Europe. News reports from Pakistan this weekend indicate Kashmiri may have been killed in a U.S. missile strike, but U.S. officials have not yet confirmed that. ProPublica and PBS Frontline are working on a documentary about the Mumbai and Denmark terror plots that will air in the fall. 

http://www.propublica.org/article/use-our-coverage-to-understand-pakistans-terror-connections